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ABSTRACT 
 
 
BEN VAN LE. Rationale, motivation, and effect of foreign investment in 
Vietnamese companies. (Under the direction of DR. LLOYD BLENMAN). 
 
 
Existing literatures have documented that foreign investors in developed markets 
hold disproportionately more shares of firms with high turnover rates. In Vietnam, I find 
evidence that foreign investor ownership percentage is higher in firms with lower turnover 
rates, firms located in the south of Vietnam, firms listed on the Hochiminh stock exchange, 
firms that are listed longer on the exchange, large firms, and firms with low past returns. 
The effect of turnover rate on foreign ownership percentage is weak, while the coefficients 
of firm size and firm age since IPO are consistently robust.   
I find that foreign investors hold more in firms with lower government ownership, 
and firms audited by a prestigious international audit company only holds for firms listed 
on the Hanoi exchange. I find that the thesis that foreign investor percentage ownership 
stakes are higher in firms with higher current ratios holds only for the firms listed on the 
Hochiminh stock exchange. Although average firm size is higher for State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and foreign investors strongly prefer investing in large size firms, they 
strongly show their preference in firms other than SOEs. By excluding the effect of size, I 
find that foreign ownership percentage stakes in firms listed on the Hanoi exchange are 
lower than foreign ownership percentage stakes in firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange. 
Interestingly, since dividend began being taxed, foreigner ownership percentage has been 
lower in firms with high dividend yields. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Studies find evidence that investors do not fully take advantage of the benefits of 
global diversification. Solnik (1974), among others, finds that cross-border 
diversification of equity portfolios offers potential gains to investors. De Santis and 
Gerard (1997) argue that severe U.S. market declines are contagious at the international 
level, and often imply a significant reduction in the expected gains from international 
diversification. Grauer and Hakansson (1987) suggest that the risk of an investment 
portfolio can be reduced by incorporating foreign securities, and finds that the gains from 
including non-U.S. asset categories into the universe of portfolio assets were remarkably 
large.1 
However, Merton (1987) and Huberman (2001) indicate that investors are more 
likely to invest in familiar securities. French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner 
(1994) show that at the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of stock market wealth 
invested domestically was in excess of 90 percent for the U.S. and Japan, and more than 
80 percent for the U.K. and Germany. French and Poterba (1991) find that the reason for 
the lack of international diversification is the result of investor choices, rather than 
institutional constraints such as transaction costs and a dividend withholding tax.  
Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) point out that equity home bias has decreased in 
developed countries due to the financial globalization trend, but still remains high in most 
                                                 
1 This is the essence of the equity home bias phenomenon. Investors invest mainly in their home securities 
ignoring the effects of diversification. 
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countries, and is particularly high in emerging markets.  Kang and Stulz (1997) and 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) among others have noted that foreign investors prefer 
high liquidity stocks.      
Vietnam is a transition economy but is also in the set of frontier economies. The 
classification as a frontier market often reflects a country’s political and market 
environment, including depth and breadth of financial markets, legal and regulatory 
infrastructure, and the general ease with which foreign investors can do business. Frontier 
markets represent countries in need of significant improvement in several areas including 
market size, openness to foreign ownership, ease of capital inflows and outflows, 
efficiency of infrastructure, and political stability2.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that frontier markets collectively 
are expected to enjoy economic growth similar to that of emerging markets over the five 
years through 2017 (4.47 percent versus 4.67 percent, respectively)3. In addition, 
investors might anticipate outsized returns from frontier markets. It is rational to argue 
that frontier countries’ markets are less developed and are generally riskier in terms of 
liquidity, market structure, and political climates.  
Then, one would expect a risk premium relative to developed markets (and also, 
one could argue, to emerging markets). Investors also find frontier markets attractive for 
a potential investment diversification. There is no or imperfect correlation of any asset 
class or sub-asset class investment with frontier markets and the remaining assets in their 
                                                 
2 There are many other classifications of frontier economies. Such classifications include low levels of 
absolute consumption, high growth rate of consumption and fragility. 
 
3 The real average annual gross domestic product growth rates as provided by the IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database (October 2012). 
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portfolios. More importantly, Vietnam is a frontier market with a combination of 
abundant natural resources and low labor costs, which are catching the attention and 
interest of large investors. 
I examine the case for equity home bias in Vietnam, a transition economy, with 
its stock exchanges in the early stages of development. The results show that the effects 
of political risk, volatility and firm beta on foreign ownership percentages are different 
for the two exchanges.4 The Hanoi exchange was established five years after the 
Hochiminh exchange, but the number of listed firms on it has grown faster than the 
number of firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange.5 There is significant equity home bias 
in Vietnam. 
In addition to the preference of foreign investors for firms located in the south 
part of Vietnam and firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange (in the south), foreign direct 
investment is also more concentrated in Hochiminh City and its surrounding provinces. 
Hanoi, the capital, and its neighboring provinces attract a lower than average level of 
foreign direct investment per capita.   
Contrary to existing studies, I find that foreign investors in Vietnam tilt their 
portfolios towards firms with lower turnover rate, a measure of market liquidity6. For the 
                                                 
4 Foreign ownership percentage equals 1-domestic ownership percentage. Low foreign ownership 
percentages are associated with high equity home bias. 
 
5 The minimum capitalization requirement for firms to be listed on the Hanoi exchange is VND 30 billion. 
The corresponding amount on the Hochiminh exchange is VND 120 billion. In addition, in order to be 
listed, firms are required to be profitable in the last 2 years at the time of becoming listed and the minimum 
ROE of the year right before being listed must be at least 5 percent. After being listed, the firms are allowed 
to switch their exchange if they meet the exchange requirement, but are not allowed to simultaneously list 
on both exchanges. During the time the firm is listed, if the market capitalization of the firm falls below the 
minimum required, and the firm does not raise more capital, the firm has to delist or switch their exchange. 
 
6 MSCI classifies Vietnam as a frontier market. Blanco (2013) argues that the frontier equity markets are 
typically pursued by investors seeking high, long-term returns arising from the exploitation of natural 
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largest turnover-rate quintile, foreign ownership percentage is consistently smaller than 
average foreign ownership percentage, while for the first two smallest turnover-rate 
quintiles, foreign ownership percentage is generally larger than the average foreign 
ownership percentage. 
   Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) summarize implicit and explicit barriers when 
analyzing potential explanations for the existence of the equity home bias. They provide 
evidence that foreign investors tend to invest in firms with certain attributes such as larger 
size, firms with high export sales, and firms with high market liquidity, as measured by 
turnover rate. 
   Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) argue that the standards of information disclosure 
in developing countries are not as good as those in developed countries. I argue that, a 
fortiori, in a frontier market more reliable information is available about a firm, after its 
listing. The firm’s age since its IPO directly influences foreign investors’ knowledge 
about that firm. Also, if the firm has been listed longer, this longer existence signals more 
certainty about its performance.7 I show that the firm that has been listed longer attracts 
a significantly higher foreigner ownership percentage. 
   Governmental controls in firms can be classified as a political risk for foreign 
investors. The economy of Vietnam shares a lot of similarity with that of China. Sun and 
Tong (2003) indicate that the Chinese government still plays an important role in the 
                                                 
resources. The finding of this dissertation shows that foreigners prefer investing in stocks that trade less 
often. The finding seems consistent with Blanco’s (2013) argument. The evidence also shows that the 
negative effect of turnover rate on foreign investors’ holdings tends to decline over time and turns positive 
in 2012. This may imply a trend that as the stock market becomes more developed, the effect of turnover 
rate reverses the sign to have a positive effect, as shown in studies such as Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), 
which find a positive relation between turnover rate and foreign holdings. 
 
7 The listed firm is automatically forced to be delisted if its profits for 3 successive years are negative. 
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reform of SOEs. This study shows that the same can be said of Vietnam. Privatization in 
Vietnam has changed thousands of SOEs from 100 percent governmental holding to 
private firms or firms with substantial reduction of government ownership percentage. 
The Vietnamese government still dominates corporate policies in hundreds of listed 
firms. 
  Megginson et al. (1994) find that profitability, operating efficiency, and real 
sales of the firms significantly improve following privatization. Sun and Tong (2002) 
summarize that the reason is generally because SOEs sometimes mix social objectives 
with maximizing profitability and the management is selected based more on political 
connections rather than on managerial skills. This dissertation shows that such political 
risk negatively affects the holdings of foreigners, but the effect is different in the two 
exchanges.  
 Foreigners disproportionately invest more in stocks with lower government 
ownership percentages. When I consider the two exchanges separately, foreign ownership 
percentage and government ownership percentage are negatively correlated. Firms listed 
on the Hochiminh exchange have higher foreign ownership percentages than firms listed 
on the Hanoi exchange. The findings also indicate that firms tend to list on the exchange 
closer to their headquarters. This implies the preference of foreigners for firms located in 
the south, closer to Hochiminh. The dissertation, therefore, shows that geographic, 
political and cultural factors influence foreigners’ holdings in the market of Vietnam.  
   The findings of this dissertation support existing studies that foreign ownership 
percentage is strongly positively correlated with firm size. More importantly, foreign 
ownership percentage in SOEs, defined as firms in which government holds at least 50 
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percent of total shares outstanding, is strongly inferior to foreign ownership percentage 
in non-SOEs, even though the average firm size of the former is much higher than the 
size of the latter. 
 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that Finnish investors whose native language 
is Swedish are more likely to own stocks of firms located in Finland that have annual 
reports in Swedish.  In Vietnam, the firms audited by foreign audit agencies will have 
financial statements issued in Vietnamese and in English. I argue that foreign investors 
are more familiar with English than with Vietnamese.  
The four foreign audit firms doing business in Vietnam; Ernst and Young, KPMG, 
Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, are prestigious and world famous. I hypothesize 
that the information from these 4 audit firms is more reliable than that disclosed by other 
audit firms. I therefore also predict that foreigners would prefer investing in firms audited 
by those 4 major international audit firms. The evidence supports this hypothesis and 
prediction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ASSOCIATED HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Although the benefits of international diversification are well established in the 
literature, a lot of studies find the evidence that investors do not take advantages of the 
global diversification. Solnik (1974), among others, finds that cross-border 
diversification of equity portfolios offers potential gains to investors. De Santis and 
Gerard (1997) argue that severe U.S. market declines are contagious at the international 
level, and often imply a significant reduction in the expected gains from international 
diversification. They also find that, the expected gains from international diversification 
for a U.S. investor is about 2.11 percent a year on average, and have not significantly 
declined. Grauer and Hakansson (1987) suggest that the risk of an investment portfolio 
can be reduced by incorporating foreign securities, and find that the gains from including 
non-U.S. asset categories in the universe were remarkably large. 
However, Fu (2009) indicates that investors in reality often do not hold perfectly 
diversified portfolios. Rather, Merton (1987) and Huberman (2001) argue that investors 
are more likely to invest in securities they know about.  
French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1994) show that at the 
beginning of the 1990s, more than 90 percent of the U.S. and Japan stock market wealth 
was domestically invested. The corresponding rate is more than 80 percent for the U.K. 
and Germany markets. French and Poterba (1991) find that investor choices, rather than 
institutional constraints such as transaction costs and a dividend withholding tax, are the 
reason for the lack of international diversification. 
8 
 
 
In international markets, investors normally have a preference for investing in 
their home countries; this phenomenon is called equity home bias. Karolyi and Stulz 
(2003) summarize that equity home bias is pervasive across countries.  Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001) summarize two potential categories of explanation for the existence 
of home equity bias, implicit barriers and explicit barriers. They focus their study on the 
implicit barriers, since over time, explicit barriers have been fallen. 
There are two trends showing the different evidence about whether foreign 
investors are less informed than local counterparts. Some studies show that foreign 
investors are not less informed than domestic, others show the reverse relationship.  Using 
the dataset of Finnish stock markets, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show that over their 
sample period, foreign investors are better at picking Finnish stocks than are domestic 
investors. Seasholes (2000) finds evidence in Taiwan that foreign institutional investors 
buy stocks before positive earnings announcements and sell stocks before negative 
earnings announcements. Both papers explain that foreign institutional investors do better 
because they are more skilled at acquiring and interpreting information.  
Karolyi (2002) shows that foreign investors in Japanese equities outperformed 
domestic individuals and institutions, including banks, trust and life insurance companies, 
and corporations themselves during the Asian financial crisis period. However, on the 
other hand, a host of studies using data from different countries also provide evidence 
that foreign investors are less informed than domestic investors. Brennan and Cao (1997) 
develop a model of international equity portfolio relying on informational differences 
between foreign and domestic investors and find that U.S. investors being at an 
informational disadvantage relative to locals in foreign markets. 
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Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) find that foreign investors buy at higher prices and 
sell at lower prices than do resident investors in Korea. Shukla and Van Inwegen (1995) 
show that when picking U.S. stocks, U.K. money managers underperform American 
money managers. Using German data Hau (2001) finds that proprietary trades on the 
German stock market do better when they are geographically closer to Frankfurt. Dvorak 
(2005) using Indonesian data, and Choe et al (2005) using Korean data all find that foreign 
investors are at an informational disadvantage. 
Upon making their portfolio allocation decisions in a mean-variance model, the 
informational disadvantage of foreign investors matters if foreign investors perceive that 
foreign stocks are riskier. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) argue that due to information 
asymmetries, foreign investors feel less informed about a country and its firms. Because 
of information disadvantages, foreign investors prefer investing in firms more known to 
them or in firms with specific attributes.  Gehrig (1993) constructs the optimal portfolio 
when foreign investors know less and shows that this assumption leads to an 
overweighting of domestic assets.  
In a deeper investigation, Kang and Stulz (1997) show evidence that controlling 
for firm size, small firms that have high export rate and firms with higher share turnover 
have more foreign ownership. Both Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001) examine  ownership percentages in several industries. Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001) show that Swedish firms belonging to construction industry is locally well-known, 
but not known internationally, therefore, foreign ownership percentage in those firms is 
low. Foreign ownership percentage stake is overweighed in chemicals and 
10 
 
 
pharmaceuticals. Kang and Stulz (1997) indicate that foreign ownership percentage stake 
is higher in firms belonging to the manufacturing industry. 
Lin and Shiu (2003) examine foreign ownership percentage in the Taiwan stock 
market from 1996 to 2000. They find foreign investors favor large firms and low book-
to-market stocks, firms with high export ratios with which they are more familiar on 
account of their higher foreign sales. Due to their different tax status, foreign investors 
may also hold slightly more stocks with low dividend yield.  Interestingly, foreign 
investors hold more shares of high beta stocks than of low beta stocks for small firms, but 
not for large firms. They argue that this is because large firms have lower investment 
barriers than small firms. Foreign investors, who demand high expected returns 
associated with high beta stocks to compensate for the costs associated with the high 
barriers to investment in small firms, may cause the phenomenon.  
The home bias literature has documented numbers of relations between portfolio 
holding decisions and different measures of proximity or familiarity, including 
geographic, economic, cultural, and industrial proximity. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 
2001), Huberman (2001), Portes and Rey (2000), and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) all 
show that the cultural proximity8 of the market and assets, as well as the geographic 
                                                 
8 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show in Finnish market that, investors whose native tongue is Finnish 
prefer holding and trading Finnish companies that publish their annual reports in Finnish to Finnish firms 
that publish their reports in Swedish and vice versa. In addition, controlling for the language with which 
the firm communicates and the distance from the investor, investors in Finland prefer holding and trading 
firms whose CEO is of similar cultural origin. 
 
11 
 
 
proximity9, and industrial proximity10, has an important influence on investor 
stockholdings and trading.  
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that the weight of a U.S. stock in a U.S. mutual 
fund, has a negative relationship with the distance between the fund location and the 
firm’s headquarters location. Mutual fund managers earn substantially abnormal returns 
in nearby investments. They also show that the extent to which a firm is held by nearby 
investors is positively related to its future expected return. The results suggest that 
investors trade local securities at an informational advantage. 
They also find that mutual fund managers do better with their holdings of stocks 
of firms located more closely to the location of the mutual fund. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) use the rich dataset of Finland and find that in the Finnish market, investors are 
more likely to trade stocks of firms that have similar language and culture with those of 
the investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) observe that 
proximity preference is less acute among larger, better-known manufacturing firms, 
                                                 
9 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that local investors in Finland prefer holding and trading stocks 
whose headquarters are closer to their locations than in those stocks whose headquarters are in more distant 
locations. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) provide evidence that the preference for investing close to home 
also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, in the U.S. market, U.S. investment managers 
exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that 
produce non-traded goods. The results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal 
investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between 
investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well-documented asset pricing 
anomalies. 
 
10 The similarity in industrial base of the home and target host countries can improve investor – firm 
familiarity concerns across markets. For instance, investors from resource-based economies may prefer 
holding and trading stocks of resource oriented firms. Brainard (1997) finds that a large portion of 
multinational investment occurs between industrialized countries as both the source and destination 
markets. 
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consistent with investors being reluctant to hold securities of firms with which they are 
not familiar.   
They observe that foreign investors tend to hold larger positions in firms that 
produce tradable output. They suggest that trade provides opportunities for increased 
information flow. For instance, U.S. investors are more likely to invest in Japanese firms 
with large tradable output, such as Sony, than those with little tradable output, such as 
Japan Telecom, because they are familiar with consuming their products.  
Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) use a rich source of explanatory variables and find 
that foreign investors are likely to invest more in large size firms, firms with high stock 
market turnover. They also find that foreign investors are more concerned about a 
country’s ability to offer investor protection rights. Foreign investors invest more in 
countries with higher GDP per capita, higher real growth rate of GDP, and higher country 
credit rating. In addition, foreign investors tend to overweight in countries sharing their 
language, and which are also closer geographically.  
In addition, Degryse and Ongena (2005) find that a new borrower may have to 
visit the bank two or three times to obtain a loan. Loan rates decrease with the distance 
between the firm and its lending bank, because of transportation costs. Hauswald and 
Marquez (2003) find that the uninformed lender charges a higher loan rate to remote 
borrowers to compensate for the adverse selection problem. 
Ko et al. (2007) examine the Japan and Korea markets and find that foreign 
investors have a clearer preference for stocks with large capitalization and low book-to-
market ratios than do institutional investors in both Japanese and Korean stock markets. 
The stocks that are preferred simultaneously by both institutional and foreign investors 
13 
 
 
show statistically significant positive abnormal returns in both Korea and Japan, whereas 
those preferred by either institutional or foreign investors show statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns only in Korea.  
Jeon, Lee and Moffett (2011) examine the relationship between foreign ownership 
percentage and the decisions on payout policy in the Korean stock market and find that 
most of foreign investors are institutional, and show a preference for firms that pay high 
dividends. They agree that institutions are more effective at monitoring management and 
detecting firm quality than retail investors. Firms may be able to signal their quality by 
initiating dividends and attracting institutional investors who have the tax advantages 
over individuals. In particular, only high- quality firms are able to bear the tax-based costs 
of dividends to attract better informed investors, while low-quality firms cannot, because 
they do not want their true type to be revealed. 
Sercu, Piet and Vanpee (2007) specify several possible theories that purport to 
explain equity home bias. However, they conclude that none of the theories can explain 
the full extent of equity home bias. The first theory deals with the hedging of domestic 
risk. Domestic assets serve as a better hedge for risks that are home-country specific such 
as inflation risk and domestic risk. Investments in domestic assets are likely to follow the 
performance of the domestic market in general. However, empirical evidence from Sercu, 
Piet and Vanpee (2008) and others is weak, indicating that using the need to hedge 
domestic risk as an explanatory factor cannot explain the puzzle. 
The second theory tries to explain equity home bias by focusing on transaction 
costs and the role of barriers to international investments. Martin and Rey (2004) show 
that small transaction costs can cause a severe equity home bias. However, Warnock 
14 
 
 
(2001) concludes that foreign turnover rates are similar to domestic turnover rates. Hence 
in his setting, transaction costs fail as an explanation for the equity home bias puzzle.  
The third theory focuses on information asymmetries. Many studies show that 
foreign investors are not less informed than domestic counterparts. Brennan and Cao 
(1997) develop a model of international equity portfolio relying on informational 
differences between foreign and domestic investors and find that U.S. investors are at an 
informational disadvantage relative to locals in foreign markets. Dziuda and Mondria 
(2012) among others argue that individuals watch domestic television, listen to domestic 
radio, and read domestic newspapers. They have more precise information about 
domestic assets’ payoffs, and hence, investing domestically carries less risk when these 
individuals invest on their own. 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) argue that due to information asymmetries, 
foreign investors feel less informed about a country and its firms. Because of information 
disadvantages, foreign investors prefer investing in firms more known to them or in firms 
with specific attributes. Gehrig (1993) constructs the optimal portfolio when foreign 
investors know less and shows that this assumption leads to an overweighting of domestic 
assets.  
Both Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), note that firms 
that are more well-known to foreign investors have greater foreign ownership percentage. 
They believe that large firms are more well-known than small firms. Kang and Stulz 
(1997) analyze the holding of foreign investors in the Japanese market and find that 
foreign investor ownership percentage is disproportionately high in firms with good 
15 
 
 
accounting performance, high market capitalization, low leverage, and low individual 
risk.  
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that foreign investors show preference for 
large firms, firms listed on international stock exchanges, and exporting firms. However, 
foreign investors invest less in firms with a dominant owner. Ko et al. (2007) examine 
the Japan and Korea markets and find that foreign investors have a stronger preference 
for stocks with large capitalization and low book-to-market ratios than do institutional 
investors in both Japanese and Korean stock markets.  
Hypothesis 1: The foreign ownership stake in larger firms is higher than that in 
smaller firms. 
Kang and Stulz (1997) show evidence that small firms that have high export rate 
and firms with higher share turnover have higher foreign ownership percentage stakes.  
Both Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) examine the ownership 
percentage in several industries. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) show that Swedish 
firms belonging to construction industries are locally well-known but not known 
internationally, therefore, foreign ownership percentage in those firms is low. However, 
foreign ownership percentage is overweighed in chemicals and pharmaceuticals which 
are internationally well-known industries. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use a Finnish dataset and find that in the Finnish 
market, investors are more likely to trade stocks of firms that have similar language and 
culture with those of the investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson 
(2001) observe that proximity preference is less acute among larger, better-known 
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manufacturing firms, consistent with investors being reluctant to hold securities of firms 
with which they are not familiar.   
Sarkissian and Schill (2004) find that the geographic proximity of a foreign 
market plays a dominant role in selecting overseas listing destinations. Degryse and 
Ongena (2005) find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and its 
lending bank, because of transportation costs.  
If domestic investors have better information their expected returns should differ 
from those of foreign investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), using Finnish stock 
markets data, and Huang and Shiu (2006) using Taiwanese data show that over their 
sample periods, foreign investors are better at picking stocks than are domestic investors. 
In the market of Taiwan, Seasholes (2000) finds that foreign institutional investors 
perform well before earnings announcements of firms. They buy stocks before positive 
earnings announcements and sell stocks before negative earnings announcements. These 
papers explain that foreign institutional investors outperform domestic investors because 
they are more skilled at acquiring and interpreting information.  
Karolyi (2002) shows that in Japan, foreign investors outperformed domestic 
individuals and institutions, including banks, trust and life insurance companies, during 
the Asian financial crisis period. Dziuda and Mondria (2012) argue that foreign institution 
investors can hire domestic and foreign experts to perform analyses about domestic and 
foreign markets, thus, information-based explanations of the equity home bias puzzle do 
not take into account this possibility. 
Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) argue that the standards of information disclosure in 
developing countries are weaker than those of developed countries. There are 4 
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prestigious international audit firms doing business in Vietnam: Ernst and Young, 
KPMG, Deloitte, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Their audit reports are of high quality. 
Audit fees charged by those 4 audit firms are much higher than audit fees charged by 
local audit firms. Therefore, only listed companies that have good informational 
transparency hire those prestigious audit firms. 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign ownership percentage is higher in firms audited by a 
prestigious international audit company. 
Hochiminh is the economic center of Vietnam, with the best infrastructure system 
and the more open-minded ideology of a market economy. The market capitalization 
minimum requirement is lower for firms listed on the Hanoi exchange. The two 
exchanges require that the ROE of listed firms be 5 percent or higher. In addition, the 
Hochiminh exchange requires the listed firms to be profitable for the 2 last years.  
Hypothesis 3: Foreign ownership percentage is higher in firms listed on the 
Hochiminh exchange. 
Dahlquist, Pinkowitz and Stulz (2003), show that controlling shareholders who 
are typically domestic investors hold part of the firm’s shares. Hence only a percentage 
of the shares can be freely traded. Morse and Shive (2011) find that measures of 
patriotism are significantly related to equity home bias measures. Ke, Ng and Wang 
(2006) find no supporting evidence for the information-based explanation and tend to 
conclude that familiarity drives equity home bias.  
Sun and Tong (2002) propose that SOEs mix social objective with maximizing 
profitability and the management is elected due to political connections rather than on 
managerial skill. The Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 for Vietnam shows a low 
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transparency rating. Vietnam ranks 123 out of 176 countries, where ranking 1 means the 
most transparent and lowest level of corruption. Hence foreign investors prefer firms 
having low government ownership stakes.  
Hypothesis 4: Foreign ownership percentage is higher in firms with lower 
government ownership percentage.  
In addition, the data show that 199 out of 703 listed firms have government 
ownership percentage being at least 50 percent. The average of government ownership 
stake in the whole market is 25.16 percent. Previous studies show the negative effect of 
ownership concentration. High percentages of government ownership can also proxy for 
ownership concentration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, THE REFORMS OF STATE 
OWNED ENTERPRISES AND STOCK EXCHANGES IN VIETNAM 
 
 
3.1. Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam 
The political –social structure of Vietnam is unique with the unusual changing 
from a market economy to a Soviet Union styled economy (1954 in the North, 1975 in 
the South), and then currently from the Soviet Union styled economy back to a market 
economy. After the defeat of France in 1954, Vietnam was temporarily divided into two 
parts, the North and the South. The south was considered democratic, supported by the 
United States and the Western developed countries. In the North, the government 
nationalized and transformed existing private enterprises to establish a Soviet Union style 
economy in the North of Vietnam. This enabled the government to maintain state control 
of the economy’s “commanding heights”. The government immediately installed a 
central-planning society-economy model, similar to those of Soviet Union and China.  
The main purposes of the model are quick industrialization, collectivization of 
agriculture and strong central control of the economy. In order to achieve these objectives, 
the Vietnamese leaders claimed that SOEs should play a leading role in the economy. 
Consequently, the SOE sector was rapidly established through both a comprehensive 
nationalization program of existing privately-owned enterprises and a creation of new 
SOEs. Indeed, by the end of 1960, 100 percent of the industrial enterprises, 99.4 percent 
of the commercial enterprises, and 99 percent of the transportation enterprises, which had 
been private firms, were nationalized and transformed into SOEs. In addition, during the 
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first five-year 1961-1965, the government invested, on average, 61.2 percent of total 
budget expenditures in establishing new SOEs. Consequently, by 1965, North Vietnam 
had both nationalized firms and newly established SOEs, both were called SOEs. 
Under the central planning regime, the SOEs were directly controlled and 
managed by governmental agencies. The governmental agencies decided all plans and 
strategies of SOEs: how to produce, what to produce and how to distribute the products. 
The duties of the SOEs are simply those of receiving inputs, operating the production 
processes and submitting the finished products to the state. In particular, operating profits, 
pre-determined in the SOEs plans, were transferred to the government budget, while 
losses were subsidized by the government budget.  
While in the North, the economy is planning centralized, the economy of the 
South of Vietnam was a market economy. But the data and information of this economy 
are not available and well documented. 
After the unification of the country in 1975, the Vietnamese government repeated 
the nationalization procedure, implemented in the North after 1954, on private firms in 
the South. Under this process, almost all of private and public enterprises under the former 
government in the South were quickly and forcefully transformed into northern-style 
SOEs. 
By the beginning of 1978, the government nationalized about 1,500 private 
enterprises, with about 130,000 employees or 70 percent of the workforce in this sector. 
Those firms were consolidated and became 650 new SOEs.  The ownership in the society 
of Vietnam is similar to what Guriev and Megginson (2005) summarize “in the socialist 
countries, public ownership of the means of production was the essential piece of 
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ideology; private ownership was limited to personal consumption goods and – in some 
countries – to small agricultural land plots”. 
The performance of SOEs exhibited lower levels of  efficiency since employees 
in those firms do not have much incentive to perform well. Employees in the firms 
received flat salary to complete production plans assigned by the government agencies. 
The production plans include plans of input, plans of output and distributions. The 
accounting system was quite simple. Profit was calculated based on the number of 
products produced during the period, multiplying by the rate of profit planned in each 
unit of products. Because of that, the management policy of government in those SOEs 
can be considered failure11. The consequences of this failure policy were huge.  The 
average growth rate of GDP was only 1.7 percent compared to 13.0 or 14.0 percent per 
year as targeted. In addition, with an almost closed economy combined with a bad 
agricultural harvest the government was not able to supply inputs to the production of 
SOEs and food to people.  
Facing the threat of economic crisis, the government started to reconsider the 
merits of the model that it was pursuing. Since January 1981, the government began to 
allow SOEs some limited open rights in production process. By which, besides the plans 
assigned by government agencies, SOEs could have an extra production plan and decide 
                                                 
11 Prices of all products were predetermined and controlled by the government. For instance, the total cost 
of a product was 100 and the planned profit rate was considered 5 percent, then the price of the product 
was 105. Although products were priced, they were not freely traded in the market. The distribution system 
of the government, the unique official distribution channel, sold these products to specific governmental 
employees, workers of SOEs. Farmers were allowed to buy only some essential goods such as clothes, salt, 
kerosene for lighting, tobacco for wedding or funeral, cookies for New Year events. The government 
decided the consumption level of each person, and one was not allowed to buy more than the level 
determined. That initiated a black market in which some people sold their surplus to those who needed it 
at a very high price. 
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what and how to produce. This means that after they completed their assigned plans, 
SOEs were allowed to produce and sell products to a limited market. It is called “limited 
market” since the distribution system was mainly managed by the government. The 
government collected products from SOEs and then distributed them to employees of 
SOEs and employees working in the governmental agencies.       
Despite having some achievements with respect to industrial production, reform 
measures in the 1980-1985 were not able to save the system of central planning. 
Specifically, the economy was still stagnating with a high state budget deficit and 
inflation. In an attempt to revive the economy and control inflation, a policy package 
(price, wage and monetary reform) was launched in September 1985. Consequently, 
prices were still centrally determined and SOEs were given more subsidies. In 1986, the 
consumer price index (CPI) was 487 percent. The unexpected macroeconomic impact of 
the policy package urged the government to take more drastic economic-reform measures 
in the second half of the 1980s.  
During the reforms of the economy, centering on the transformation of SOEs, the 
capital from abroad has been critical to the development of a transition economy of 
Vietnam. In 1987, the National Assembly of Vietnam approved the first Foreign 
Investment Law in Vietnam to initiate the inflow of capital from investors around the 
world. One year later, the first total foreign direct investment (FDI) registered capital was 
USD 219 million. By the end of 2012, the accumulated FDI registered capital reached 
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USD 210,251 million with 14,522 projects, while the GDP of 2012 is USD 155,820 
million12. 
According to the General Statistic Office of Vietnam, up to December 2012, the 
top four countries with largest cumulated FDI registered capital include Japan, 28.7 USD 
billion, Taiwan, 27.1 USD billion, Singapore, 24.9 USD billion, and South Korea, 24.8 
USD billion. The data indicate that the market of Vietnam is more attractive to investors 
coming from countries close to Vietnam. 
                                                 
12 According to the General Statistics Office, investment is the entire amount of expenses (spending) to 
maintain or increase production capacity and resources to improve the material and spiritual living 
standards of the entire society in a given period, including investment to generate fixed assets, investment 
to increase current assets, spending on purchasing precious assets, reserving gold in the form of goods, 
commodities and stocks in residents and other investment to improve people's knowledge, enhance social 
welfare, improve the ecological environment, support people’s welfare, etc.  
 
Inward (inflow) foreign direct investment is total amount of legitimate cash and in-kind that foreigners 
invest in Vietnam and in approved projects, in the form of foreign currency, machinery, equipment, 
supplies, materials, fuels, finished goods, semi-finished goods, value of industrial property rights, technical 
know-how, technical processes and services, intellectual property rights and other legal properties. 
Appendix F specifies the forms of FDI in Vietnam, accumulated until 12/31/2012.   
 
Some of the capital market inflows are FDI if the foreigners take control of the listed firm, and some are 
the shareholding of FDI firms. The correlation between the origin of foreign investors in FDI and in the 
stock market is approximately 0.45. 
 
Registered FDI capital is the value of licensed projects. Implementation FDI capital is the value of licensed 
projects that are implemented. The accumulated FDI registered capital of each year is the cumulative capital 
that is registered up to the end of that year. That is the total of the accumulated amount at the beginning of 
the year and the additional capital registered during the year. 
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The FDI ratios on GDP are relatively high in 2 periods 1994-1997 and 2007-2010. 
Particularly, the FDI registered capital is equal 72.36 percent of GDP for 2008, one year 
after the WTO membership of Vietnam. This may be the consequence of a series of 
international affairs related to Vietnam. In 1994, the United States officially abolished the 
embargo against Vietnam, put in effect in 1964 for the North and 1975 for Vietnam as a 
whole. In 1995, the formal normalization of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the 
United States was set, after 20 years without formal diplomatic contacts. In 2007, Vietnam 
became an official WTO official member.  
Figure 1 presents the registered FDI, percentage of registered FDI over GDP and 
GDP growth each year from 1991 to 2012. The left scale in figure 1 is the value, in USD 
million. The bars depict the value of registered FDI. The right scale indicates the 
percentage. The fluctuation lines in the figure show the two measures: the percentage of 
registered FDI over total GDP, the percentage of implementation FDI over GDP, and the 
GDP growth of each year. The GDP growth is pretty high for 2 periods, 1992-1997, and 
2002-2007. The Asian financial crisis during 1998-1999 negatively affected the GDP 
growth and registered FDI. 
.
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Cheng and Kwan (2000) investigate the determinants of the location of foreign 
direct investment in China during the period 1985-1995. They find that throughout 29 
Chinese regions, regions with markets, good infrastructure, and preferential policy had a 
positive effect but wage cost had a negative effect on FDI. Education had a positive, but 
insignificant effect on FDI. In addition, FDI per capita had a strong self-reinforcing effect 
of its past value on its current value. 
Vietnam comprises of 63 provinces (and cities that are equivalent to provinces) 
which are divided into 6 regions. Each region includes provinces (cities) that share similar 
social-economic attributes. For instance, region 1 includes Hanoi, the capital, and its 
surrounding provinces. The primary characteristic of this region is that the region is the 
Hong Delta River area. Over thousands of years, people have shared lunar/agricultural 
culture. The southeast region (region 5) includes Hochiminh city and surrounding 
provinces. Region 5 is considered more industrialized than region 1. Appendix E provides 
the descriptions of the 6 regions in Vietnam in more detail. 
Figure 2 provides the FDI per capita of the 6 regions for a period from 2007 to 
2012. In addition to the 6 regions, I also divide the total sample into 2 large regions, the 
north region and the south region. The classification of the north and the south is consistent 
with the later section where I analyze the location effect on foreign ownership in the stock 
exchanges of Vietnam. The north region is the area from Danang northwards, and the 
Hochiminh area is the area from Danang southward. The data shows that the FDI per capita 
is higher for provinces of the southeast region (region 5) and lowest for provinces of region 
2. 
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Figure 2 shows that FDI is more concentrated in the south area, particularly, in 
Hochiminh city and the around southeast provinces. This region, considered the most 
active area, has highest per capita income and attracts the highest per capita FDI. Region 
2 and region 4 are mountainous areas, and have the lowest FDI per capita level. The data 
in table 24 shows that among the top 5 provinces or cities in attracting foreign direct 
investment, four provinces or cities are in the southeast area. 
Interestingly, Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, and its surrounding active provinces 
only have the FDI level close to the average FDI level of the country. Although per capita 
income and transportation of region 1 are more improved than those of region 3, the per 
capita FDI of region 3 is a little higher than that of region 1. This finding is consistent 
with the finding in the next section, implying that foreign ownership in the listed 
companies in Vietnam is higher for firms located in the south region, and for firms listed 
on the Hochiminh stock exchange, in the south than for firms located in the north region, 
and firms listed on the Hanoi stock exchange, in the north of Vietnam. 
In a deeper analysis of the determinants of the FDI per capita location in Vietnam, 
I regress the FDI per capita (dependent variable) on several explanatory variables, using 
a panel data for a period of 2007-2012. The dependent variable is the year end 
accumulated registered FDI of each province divided by the year end population of that 
province. The definitions of independent variables are included in Appendix A. The 
description of PCI, provincial competitiveness index, methodology is included in 
Appendix B. 
The regression results are summarized in Appendix I. In all of the four models, 
the TotalStudent is strongly significant. The results imply that the total number of 
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primary, secondary, and high school students in each province has a pronounced effect 
on FDI per capita. An increase in a student for every one thousand people will increase 
investment from USD 3.69 to USD 4.65 FDI per capita. It can be interpreted that foreign 
investors prefer investing in locations with higher educated population, a potentially good 
labor source. In addition, since the infrastructure and transportation in Vietnam are less 
developed than those in developed countries, it may be costly and difficult to recruit 
workers from distant regions in Vietnam. By recruiting labor in the surroundings, FDI 
firms can save expenditures.  
The coefficient of the last year FDI per capita is also consistently significant. The 
results also support Cheng and Kwan (2000) finding a strong self-reinforcing effect of its 
past value on its current value. 
I expect that foreign investors prefer to invest in provinces or cities with higher 
provincial competitiveness indices to save entry costs, enjoy high transparency and access 
to information, reduce time on understanding and complying with regulations of the local 
authorities. In addition, higher PCI also implies lower informal charges that are under the 
table expenses, higher proactivity of provincial leaders, higher business support from 
provincial authorities such as provincial services for private sector, provision of 
regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking. However, the coefficient 
of PCI is insignificant and negative, indicating that provinces with higher PCI have lower 
per capita FDI.  
Some possible explanations for a negative relationship between per capita FDI 
and PCI as follows. First, under the table expense may be considered efficient in a 
corruption environment. In a society with lower transparency, some extra expense may 
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help a firm acquire information or assets that are not available to other firms. The firm 
can exploit the acquired assets or information for its profit maximization purpose and the 
benefits may be much higher than expenses. Second, in a unique political party country, 
a close relationship with local authorities is a crucial key to the success of a firm.     
The coefficients of Bed and Doctor are also insignificant and negative. The 
negative coefficients suggest that as the number of hospital beds and medical doctor per 
capita increase, the FDI per capita declines. However, I expect that foreigners invest more 
in provinces and cities with better medical and treatment conditions.  
 
3.2. Privatization of State Owned Enterprises   
  The Sixth National Party Congress of December 1986 marked an important shift 
in the economic reforms. Specifically, the central planning mechanism was officially 
abandoned and replaced by a targeted market economy. This policy is often referred to 
as economic reform called renovation (doi moi in Vietnamese). The first and most 
important component in the framework of doi moi was Decision 217/HDBT, issued in 
November 1987. Under this Decision, the elements of the old planning mechanism on the 
SOEs are removed. Particularly, the SOEs had rights to determine both inputs and outputs 
of the production. Prices of products were now determined on the basis of supply and 
demand conditions in the market, but not by the government agencies as before.  
Guriev and William Megginson (2005) summarize that privatization has spread 
to many industries, including those that had never been privately owned, and has 
transformed command economies in post-communist countries into decentralized ones. 
More importantly, privatization has revolutionized global financial markets. In Vietnam, 
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the government launched a privatization, preferably called ‘’equitization’’ program in 
mid-1992. This effort in restructuring the SOEs achieved an impressive result in reducing 
the number of SOEs. The number of SOEs decreased from 12,297 in 1991 to 6,264 by 
April 1994. 
The SOEs were further restructured following the issuance of Decision 90 and 91 
in 1994 on the establishment of General Corporations, namely General Corporation 90 
and General Corporation 91. Specifically, Decision 90 called for the establishment of 
state corporations with at least five voluntary SOE members and minimum legal capital 
of VND 100 billion while Decision 91 called for formation of much larger corporations 
with at least seven SOE members appointed by the state and minimum legal capital of 
VND 1,000 billion. 
 Implementing these Decisions, the government consolidated several existing 
SOEs and established new SOEs to form 90/91 General Corporations. Therefore, each 
90/91 General Corporation comprises an average of 20 to 30 subsidiaries which are 
independent one from each other in business. With respect to management, the General 
Corporation 90 belongs to corresponding ministries or provincial governments while the 
General Corporation 91 is directly under the control of the Prime Minister. For example, 
in 1995, the ministry of construction of Vietnam managed about 15 construction 
corporations which are General Corporations 90, the Prime Minister monitored about 50 
General Corporations 91.  
The SOEs have been significantly reorganized after the enactment of the Law on 
SOEs in 1995. According to the Law, SOEs are classified into two groups, profit-seeking 
SOEs and non-profit SOEs. Moreover, the roles of ministries and provincial governments 
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in controlling the SOEs (controlling agencies) are clearly defined in this Law. In specific, 
the controlling agencies have the authority to restructure or dissolve SOEs as well as 
appoint senior positions in the SOEs (the Chairman and other members of the board of 
directors, the manager and chief accountants). 
Furthermore, the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in managing 
the capital of government in the SOEs, the relationship between MOF and other 
controlling agencies of the SOEs are determined in the Law. Importantly, the SOEs are 
allowed to decide what, how and for whom to produce. The SOEs are almost independent 
in using their capital and assets including those received from the government. In SOEs, 
only important investment requires the approval of the governmental authority. Finally, 
SOEs have rights of using their profits. 
It is a wide spread belief in Vietnam that, the SOE reform measures in this period, 
combined with the success of macroeconomic reform and investment from abroad, has 
led Vietnam to achieve a high rate of economic growth, especially in the period of 1992 
-1997. The abolishment of the embargo against Vietnam in 1994, the formalization with 
the United States in 1995 boosted the foreign investment in Vietnam with the ratio of FDI 
on GDP being higher than 10 percent. During this period, the yearly GDP growth rate is 
at least 8.1 percent and up to 9.5 percent.  
However, the SOEs entered a difficult phase since the end of 1997 due to the 
financial crisis in Asia. Indeed, they faced serious problems in selling their products in 
both the domestic market and the international market because of the currency 
devaluations of neighbor countries. Consequently, the SOEs’ performance generally 
deteriorated, and many of them incurred losses. In fact, by the end of 1997, around 60 
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percent of the total SOEs reported negative profits. Poor performance of the SOEs partly 
resulted in a decrease in economic growth for the period of 1998-1999. To improve the 
poor performance of the SOEs and avoid subsidies from the state budget to SOEs, the 
government has been continuously conducting SOEs reform since 1998, focusing on 
SOEs privatization. This is consistent with Guriev and William Megginson (2005) 
arguing that the fiscal issues provide government with incentives to undertake the 
privatization–to raise cash and to eliminate public subsidies to SOEs. 
The government stipulates several steps of SOEs privatization. First, the 
government agency managing the SOE (ministers, provincial people’s committees and 
state corporations) forms the steering committee for privatization. Then, the committee 
is responsible for selecting a list of SOEs that fulfill the requirements for privatization 
and submit the Prime Minister for approval. The government consecutively selects SOEs 
for privatization based on the role of these SOEs. For example, the least important SOEs 
such as construction SOEs usually rank higher priority for privatization while the most 
important SOEs including electric SOEs will be privatized later. In the second step, the 
company’s privatization board, after established, is responsible for preparing the 
company’s financial statements for the last three years, a report on the company’s 
personnel, and other required reports. 
Those reports will be transferred to the company trade union. In the next step, the 
general manager of the selected SOE has to settle debts, clarify the status of unsold 
materials, and liquidate assets identified for liquidation, open an account at a State 
Treasury agent to deposit proceeds from sales of the privatized enterprise’s shares, and 
establish a register for listing prospective shareholders. In the fourth step, the company 
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privatization board must prepare a three-year business plan for the post-privatization 
period and establish a council to re-evaluate company valuation based on regulations and 
guidance of the Ministry of Finance.  
Practically, this duty is the most complex and time-consuming in the privatization 
process. In the following step, the company’s privatization board must publicly announce 
its pre-privatization financial status and plan to sell its shares. During this process, the 
government and existing employees rank the first and the second priority to buy the firm’s 
shares, respectively. This means, the company’s privatization board first considers the 
ownership of the government in the post-privatized firm. Second, this board determines 
the firms ‘shares available to the existing employees. Then, the rest of the firm’s 
ownership will be sold to other investors.  
The main approach of privatization is the share issue privatization. Based on the 
privatization plan, the board organizes the sales, deposits proceeds to the account at the 
State Treasury, and then reports the controlling governmental agency. Furthermore, the 
board proposes a list of candidates for the board of directors and supervisors. Then the 
company privatization board organizes the first shareholder meeting in order to elect the 
board of directors, the board of supervisors and adopt the chapter of the privatized 
company. In the first meeting, the control rights of the newly privatized are completely 
set to the new owners. 
In a summary, during the privatization of SOEs, the company’s privatization 
board, appointed by the government agency, plays a critical role. This is consistent with 
Sun and Tong (2003) finding that the government of China has played a critical role 
during the SOEs reform in China.  Up to the end of 2004, a total of 2,242 SOEs, with a 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
total capital of about VND 17,700 billion, have completed the privatization process. The 
number of SOEs in 2010 is 3,283 including around 1,200 SOEs with 100 percent 
government ownership. The government plans to reduce the number of SOEs every year 
to target 650 SOEs in 2015 and then around 200 SOEs in 2020 through the privatization 
process. The contribution of SOEs to the GDP of Vietnam during period 2006-2010 is 
around 28 percent. SOEs do not seem to have to compete with other firms, because they 
receive government support and existing guarantees. 
Table 2: The decrease in the number of SOEs from 2000 to 2012 
Year 
Total number 
 of firms 
Total number 
 of SOEs 
100% foreign 
Capital Firms 
 
Joint 
Ventures 
Percentage of 
SOEs over 
Total number 
of Firms 
2000 42,288 5,759 854 
 
671 13.62 
2001 51,680 5,355 1,294 
 
717 10.36 
2002 62,908 5,363 1,561 
 
747 8.53 
2003 72,012 4,845 1,869 
 
772 6.73 
2004 91,756 4,597 2,335 
 
821 5.01 
2005 112,950 4,086 2,852 
 
845 3.62 
2006 131,318 3,706 3,342 
 
878 2.82 
2007 155,771 3,494 4,018 
 
943 2.24 
2008 205,689 3,328 4,612 
 
1,014 1.62 
2009 248,842 3,364 5,412 
 
1,134 1.35 
2010 291,299 3,283 5,995 
 
1,259 1.13 
2011 324,691 3,265 7,516 
 
1,494 1.01 
2012 341,603 3,239 7,523 
 
1,453 0.95 
 
The table indicates that while the number of SOEs has declined, the number of 
100 percent foreign capital firms and joint ventures has increased over the time. The total 
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number of firms increases by 800 percent from 2000 to 2012. The data also shows that 
the increase in the number of joint ventures still remains low. 
3.3. The Stock Exchanges in Vietnam 
The stock market in Vietnam initiated in Hochiminh city (in the South of 
Vietnam), the largest economic center of Vietnam, on 28th July 2000 with only 5 listed 
stocks corresponding to 5 initial listed companies. In 2005, Hanoi stock market (in the 
North) officially traded with 7 listed stocks. By the end of 2012, the number of listed 
firms in both exchanges is 703.  
Each stock exchange has a market index, the Hochiminh stock exchange index is 
called the VN-INDEX, and the Hanoi stock exchange index is the HaSTC Index. The 
index of each exchange is the value-weighted stock price index of all common stocks 
traded on that exchange.   
Figure 3 reveals that the percentage of the total market capitalization relative to 
GDP is almost 45 percent in 2007, and 29 percent in 2012. Although the number of listed 
firms significantly increases from 236 firms in 2007 to 703 firms in 2012, the ratio of the 
total market capitalization to GDP declines sharply.  
The major reason for the drop of this percentage is the decline in the stock 
exchanges in Vietnam since 2008. The VN Index decreases from 927 in 2007 to 316 in 
2008, and then 414 in 2012. In 2007, out of 236 listed firms, 225 firms had foreign 
ownership. In 2012, out of 703 listed firms, 661 firms have foreign ownership.    
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Figure 3: Foreign ownership percentage, number of listed stocks and market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP  from  2007 to 2012 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 
4.1. Data Descriptions 
This dissertation uses a time series dataset including all listed firms in the stock 
markets in Vietnam in a period of 2007-2012. The number of listed firms a year includes 
all firms that are listed by the end of that year. However, for calculation of some variables, 
such as returns, beta, and volatility, I include only listed firms having 52 weeks of 
transactions for the year.  
The data are collected from different sources. Daily stock prices prior February 
2007, foreign ownership, and government ownership in each firm at year end are from 
the stock exchanges of Vietnam and the FPT Securities company, an entity doing business 
under the control of Vietnam FPT group and the stock exchanges of Vietnam. Macro 
factors such as GDP and other information in Table 1 come from the General Statistic 
Office of Vietnam and DataStream. Tax laws and regulation is provided by the website 
of the Government and the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam. The other information 
including daily stock prices after February 2007, year firms’ measures of dividend yield, 
market capitalization, etc. are from DataStream. 
There are two stock exchanges in Vietnam, located in the 2 largest cities of 
Vietnam, Hanoi stock exchange located in Hanoi, and Hochiminh stock exchange located 
in Hochiminh. The Hochiminh stock exchange was launched in August 2000, while the 
Hanoi stock exchange was launched in July 2005. By the year end of 2007 there were 
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105 firms listed on the Hanoi stock exchange and 131 firms listed on the Hochiminh stock 
exchange. However, by the year end of 2012, the number of firms listed on the former 
was 395, higher the number of firms listed on the latter, 308 firms. Each market has its 
own market index called VNINDEX and HSTC indices for Hochiminh and Hanoi, 
respectively. The 2 stock exchanges are under the control of the State Securities 
Commission of Vietnam. Each exchange has several securities companies called 
members, doing business to provide information to investors, help stock exchanges and 
listed firms in listing procedures.   
The stock prices to compute returns and estimate firms' β are unadjusted prices. 
The returns calculated are daily return. If the firm is listed before 1/1/2007, I use only 
firm's price index from 1/1/2007, for firms listed after 1/1/2007, I use firm's price index 
from the first day transaction. Firm β is estimated by the market model, using firm's daily 
return and market's daily return. Firm β is the slope of relationship between the firm's 
stock price index and the market's price index where the firm is listed. If the firm changed 
the market it lists, I use the index of the market that the firm is currently listed at the year 
end of 2012. 
The data of government ownership is collected from financial statements of every 
single firm at the end of every year. The financial statements were audited by audit firms 
and submitted to the State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC), as well as the 
exchange where the firm is listed. There are 4 prominent audit firms carrying out audit 
services including PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte, and Ernst and Young.  
The data of foreign ownership percentage is available to investors, posted by the 
FPT Securities Company, a member of Hanoi stock exchange. The foreign ownership 
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percentage has been updated almost daily, the calculation is implemented after each 
transaction. 
The dataset includes all listed firms, and firms with foreign ownership. The 
ownership of foreign investor is at year end from 2007 to 2012. The laws and regulations 
of Vietnam have imposed the limits of foreign ownership, by which, the limit of holding 
for foreign investors is 49 percent of outstanding  stocks in non-banking listed firms, and 
30 percent of outstanding stocks in commercial banks. The exchange rate between USD 
and Vietnamese Dong (currency of Vietnam) increases from 16.100 in 2007 to 20.800 in 
2012. 
The market value of stocks in listed firms increases from VND 505,640 billion in 
2007 to VND 783,224 billion in 2012. However, the total number of outstanding stocks 
increases from 92,264 million to 290,757 million; the market value increases less than 
the total number of outstanding stocks because of the stock market price decline from 
2008 until the end of 2012. The market index declines from 927 in 2007 to 414 in 201213.  
In January 2007, Vietnam became an official member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), causing the number of listed firms and foreign investment to 
increase. By the end of 2006, there were totally 176 firms listed, by the end of 2012, there 
were 712 listed firms. The number of firms with foreign ownership is 226 in year end of 
2007 and 703 in year end of 2012. In this dissertation, I exclude all firms delisted by year 
end of 2012. 
                                                 
13 There has been a rapid increase in the number of listed firms from 2007 to 2012. However, due to the 
world financial crisis in 2008, the stock market of Vietnam was negatively affected. The plummet in prices 
of several stocks has caused the market index to fall from 927 in 2007 to 316 in 2008. 
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This table summarizes foreign ownership percentage average in each stock 
exchange and the total market as a whole. Foreign ownership percentage is the total shares 
held by foreigners divided by the total outstanding shares at year end of each firm. The 
equally-weighted average is calculated by taking the percentage of shares owned by 
foreigners for each firm and then averaging this percentage across firms. The value-
weighted average is the total share value owned by foreigners in all firms dividend by the 
market value of the total market. 
The equal mean is calculated as the average of simple foreign ownership 
percentage of all listed firms. The largest value is for 2007, with an equally foreign 
ownership of 11.67 percent, and the smallest corresponding is 6.61 percent for 2011. The 
value weighted percentage of foreign ownership is calculated using the market 
capitalization as the weight. Table 2 shows  that the value weighted percentage of foreign 
ownership is much larger than the equally weighted percentage of foreign ownership, 
implying that foreign investors prefer investing in large size firms. The ratio of market 
capitalization of both stock exchanges on the GDP is highest for 2007, at 44 percent and 
lowest for 2008, at 14.7 percent, and the market index is also lowest in 2008 with almost 
two-third decline from 2007. 
Table 4 summarizes foreign ownership percentage by the countries of origin of 
the foreign investors. Japan ranks number one holding 22.48 percent total market 
capitalization of the sample. The table presents the original country of foreign investors. 
The total market capitalization held by all foreign investors at year end 2012 is VND 
157,091 billion. However, the market capitalization available to determine investor origin 
is VND 82,676 billion, about 52.63 percent.  
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Table 4: Summary of foreign ownership percentage by countries 
 
Country Percentage 
Japan 22.475 
USA 13.669 
Singapore and Malaysia 12.269 
United Kingdom 9.443 
Hong Kong 8.170 
Germany 7.411 
Cayman Islands 6.958 
Denmark 6.559 
France 3.450 
British Virgin Islands 2.588 
Australia 2.458 
Switzerland 1.916 
South Korea 0.845 
Thailand 0.809 
Chile 0.287 
Taiwan 0.262 
Finland 0.139 
Mauritius 0.112 
China 0.065 
Ireland 0.049 
Sweden 0.031 
Canada 0.022 
Netherlands 0.014 
Total 100 
 
Table 4 indicates that Asian countries including Japan, Singapore and Malaysia 
disproportionately hold more shares in the market of Vietnam. Japan ranks number 1, 
Singapore ranks number 3 in both table 4 and Appendix B implying the proximity 
preference of investors for both FDI and investment in the stock markets of Vietnam. 
Both countries are geographically close to Vietnam. 
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Table 5: Foreign ownership percentage by industries 
Industry 
Equally weighted 
foreign ownership 
percentage 
Value weighted 
foreign ownership 
percentage 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 17.56 38.12 
Food Producers  11.69 36.94 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 25.27 36.47 
Travel and Leisure  13.31 28.49 
Industrial Engineering  5.14 28.13 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 12.88 26.10 
Electricity 10.08 25.93 
General Industrials  6.87 25.57 
Health Care Equipment and Services 15.71 24.57 
Nonlife Insurance  19.82 22.69 
Oil and Gas Producers  16.05 21.91 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment 12.67 21.44 
Financial Services (Sector)  7.59 20.48 
General Retailers  9.23 19.81 
Personal Goods  10.72 17.84 
Chemicals  10.93 17.83 
Banks  16.61 17.31 
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Table 5: (continued) 
 
Industrial Transportation  7.28 15.98 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 7.61 14.81 
Construction and Materials  4.87 13.46 
Real Estate Investment and Services 8.90 12.95 
Software and Computer Services 7.01 9.63 
Industrial Metals and Mining 7.75 8.74 
Gas, Water and Multi-utilities 13.58 8.68 
Mining 6.04 7.73 
Support Services  5.24 7.68 
Unclassified  4.10 7.67 
Beverages 3.70 4.07 
Oil Equipment and Services  4.81 2.15 
Media 2.44 2.14 
Average 7.81 20.02 
 
 
Table 5 presents foreign ownership average in each industry. The equally-
weighted average is calculated by taking the percentage of shares owned by foreigners 
for each firm and then averaging this percentage across firms. The value-weighted 
average is the total share value owned by foreigners in all firms dividend by the market 
value of the total market. 
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In Vietnam, the measure of industries of each firm is different between several 
agencies. At this time, there is no concrete standard about industry of a firm. I use the 
industry classification of the DataStream for my analysis. Table 5 shows the evidence 
that foreign investors hold more stocks in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology with the 
foreign ownership of 38.12 percent calculated using weighted value where the weight is 
the firm’s market capitalization. The weighted average foreign ownership may be 
considered high since the limit foreign ownership imposed by the government is 49 
percent.  
The corresponding value is 17.56 percent computed using a simple average. In 
Vietnam, most of medicine is imported, the local pharmaceuticals and biotechnology is 
quite primitive. The next industries are food producers, fixed line telecommunication and 
travel and leisure. Banking industry average ownership is 17.31 percent of market 
capitalization weighted value, and 16.61 percent simple weighted value, while the limit 
ownership for foreign investors is 30 percent for this industry. 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find evidence of low foreign ownership in 
construction firms of Sweden. They argue that this industry appears typically local, as a 
sequence, foreign investors are not familiar with this industry. The evidence in Vietnam 
is consistent with the evidence in Sweden, and the foreign ownership percentage is low 
in construction firms. Real estate is also an industry that does not appear attractive to 
foreign investors.  
In 1993, it was the first time Vietnam has the Law of Land. The 1980 Constitution 
specified that people can own houses, but cannot own land, rather, land is owned by the 
government which is all people’s representative. This regulation is still in effect and 
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seems to prevent foreign investors from long run investing. Currently, citizens are 
allowed to own their houses, but not allowed to own the land on which the houses are 
located. The public ownership of land everywhere is mandated by the constitution, which 
makes it ambiguous to determine the owner of a piece of land.15 Beverages and media are 
less attractive to foreign investors, but are more local, because those products are mostly 
consumed by domestic markets, but not exported. 
 
4.2. Empirical Model 
Studies including Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
investigate several firm characteristics to examine the determinants of foreign ownership 
in several developed markets. I use some novel firm characteristic variables in a 
multivariate linear regression analysis to explore the relationship between foreign 
ownership percentage and firm characteristics. The estimated equation is a standard linear 
regression model as follows. 
yi,t = α + βX i,t +εi,t    
where yi,t is the foreign ownership percentage in firm i at year-end t, X i,t is a vector that 
represents the firm i’s characteristic variables i at year t ; and εi,t is the error term. 
The explanatory variables are also summarized in Appendix A, including: 
Size: This variable is the market capitalization of the firm at each year-end. 
Current studies find evidence that the foreign ownership and the firm size have a positive 
                                                 
15 Citizens have all rights to their lands but the ownership. For example, they can use their land for living, 
leasing, etc., or sell the land. In official documents, when a person sells his land, it is written as “sell the 
right to use the land”, but cannot state “sell the land”. Due to the ambiguous regulation about the ownership, 
whenever the government would like to take over the land currently used by a household, the compensation 
imposed by the government is usually lower than the market value of the land taken over. The household 
cannot appeal since the public, but not the household, is the owner of that land. 
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relationship. In the regression, I use the log of the market capitalization of the firm at each 
year end. 
DividendYield: The value of all dividends paid during the year divided by the 
market value of the firm at year-end.  
Systematic risk is the beta coefficient for the market model, estimated using daily 
returns. The market index where the firm listed is used to calculate the coefficient beta. 
During the year, if the firm shifts from one market to another one, I will use the index of 
the market where the firm is listed at the year end. 
MarketToBook: The ratio is defined as the market price of a share divided by its 
book value at year-end. 
CurrentRatio: I use this as a proxy for short-term financial distress. It is calculated 
as current assets divided by current liabilities at year-end, and measures the ability of the 
firm to meet its short-term payment requirements. In the sample the mean of CurrentRatio 
is 235 percent. 
Leverage: This is a measure of long-term financial distress. It is defined as the 
ratio of total debt to total common equity at year-end. The mean of Leverage in the sample 
is 104 percent. The cost of capital in Vietnam is generally considered high. Thus, foreign 
investors would invest less in firms with high leverage ratios. 
Log(IPOAge) is the logarithm of the number of year since the firm’s IPO. In 
Vietnam where information asymmetry is high, information about a firm is much more 
available after the firm is listed. Therefore, the time horizon from the IPO of a firm is 
important to foreign investors. I expect the longer the firm has been listed, the more well-
known it will be to foreign investors.  
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TurnOverRate: This rate is a measure of the market liquidity of the firm's shares. 
It is defined as the total shares traded over a year divided by the total shares of the firm 
at year end. 
GovernmentOwn: This variable measures the effect of ownership of the 
government on the investment of foreign investors. It is defined as the proportion of 
shares held by the government at each firm at year end. 
DummyListedHN: equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the Hanoi stock exchange, 
equal to zero if the firm is listed on the Hochiminh stock exchange. In Vietnam, at the 
same time, a firm is only listed on an exchange. The listing requirement of the two 
exchanges is almost the same. The major difference between the two exchanges is the 
regulation about firm size.  
DummyForeignAudit: equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of four big 
international audit firms operating in Vietnam including KPMG, Ernst and Young, 
Deloitte, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Return: The return of each stock is calculated using stock daily unadjusted price. 
Volatility: this is the standard deviation of daily stock price, reflecting the 
individual risk of each stock. 
Table 6 presents the correlations among variables. The sample shows the negative 
relationship between foreign ownership percentage and TurnOverRate, government 
ownership percentage, beta, volatility, dividend yield, Leverage and DummyListedHN. 
On the other hand, foreign ownership is positively associated with firm size, firm age, 
and the DummyForeignAudit. The simple correlations are consistent with all my 
hypotheses. 
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Table 6 also shows that TurnOverRate has a negative correlation with firm size, 
volatility and government ownership, implying that smaller firms, firms with lower 
government ownership, and firms that are more volatile trade more often. However, firms 
that are listed longer on the exchange trade more frequently than firms listed shorter on 
the exchange. The government ownership percentage is positively correlated with 
volatility implying that high government ownership stocks are more volatile.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
5. 1. Foreign Ownership Percentage and Firm Size 
Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find a strong positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm sizes in Japanese and Swedish markets. 
The hypothesis predicts a position association between foreign ownership and firm size 
in the market of Vietnam. 
Table 7: Foreign ownership percentage and firm size 
Panel A: Value weighted average of foreign ownership percentage by firm size quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Average N 
2007 3.56 5.52 10.73 15.98 23.96 22.08 234 
2008 2.23 5.01 6.52 13.24 23.71 21.98 318 
2009 2.36 3.23 5.58 8.68 21.37 19.52 435 
2010 2.12 2.5 6.65 7.05 20.33 18.48 624 
2011 2.3 2.3 5.38 7.53 20.93 19.54 683 
2012 3.38 2.91 5.59 7.16 21.12 20.06 702 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted average of foreign ownership percentage by firm size quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Average N 
2007 2.9 5.47 10.22 16.22 23.49 11.66 234 
2008 2.14 4.84 6.1 13.95 21.65 9.73 318 
2009 2.45 3.18 5.01 9.02 18.19 7.57 435 
2010 2.06 2.64 6.29 7.15 16.11 6.85 624 
2011 2.28 2.3 5.08 7.22 16.13 6.6 683 
2012 3.53 2.94 5.55 7.11 18.65 7.56 702 
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Table 7 presents foreign ownership percentage in each firm size quintile. The 
equally weighted average is calculated by taking the percentage of shares owned by 
foreigners for each firm and then averaging this percentage across firms. The value 
weighted average is the total share value owned by foreigners in all firms divided by the 
market value of the total market. 
The table ranks the firms based on their market capitalization at each year end 
from 2007 to 2012. Firms are sorted into quintiles with the quintile 1 having the lowest 
and the quintile 5 with the highest market capitalization. Panel A shows the weighted 
average percentage of foreign ownership, and panel B indicates the equally weighted 
average percentage of foreign ownership in each quintile. The average columns show the 
average percentage of foreign ownership in each year of the whole market. The last 
columns present the number of firms using in calculation. 
Table 7 shows that foreign ownership percentage and firm size have a strong 
positive relationship. In every year data, foreign ownership percentage of large firms is 
much higher than that of small firms. The dissertation classifies firms into five quintiles. 
The foreign ownership percentage is markedly greater for the largest quintile firms, 
compared to other quintiles. The size of the firm represents how well the firm is known 
by foreign investors. A lot of previous studies show that the larger size the firm, the more 
well-known of the firm to foreign investors and thus, the higher foreign ownership 
percentage. For 2012, the foreign ownership of the smallest quintile is 3.38 percent, while 
the foreign ownership of the largest quintile is 21.12 percent. The evidence in panel A 
also indicates that out of 5 quintiles, every year, only firms sorted into the largest quintile 
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have a percentage of foreign ownership that is higher than the average percentage of 
foreign ownership.  
The data clearly shows the preference of foreign investors to large firms. The 
average firm sizes are large in 2007 and 2008 while smaller after 2008 because of the 
decrease in the market index. The aggregate market value of stocks  has severely declined 
since 2008. In addition, the evidence shows that during the crisis periods (2008-2011), 
that size can proxy for risk (the smaller the size, the higher risk), the holding of foreign 
investors in small firms declined drastically during crisis periods. 
The results are consistent with the findings of existing literatures including Kang 
and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001). The hypothesis is verified. 
 
5.2. Foreign Ownership Percentage and Government Ownership  
Table 8: Foreign ownership percentage and state-owned enterprises 
  
Year 
Value weighted  foreign 
ownership  
Equally  weighted  
foreign ownership 
Average firm 
size 
N 
SOEs 
Non 
SOEs 
SOEs 
Non 
SOEs 
SOEs 
Non 
SOEs 
2007 12.55 27.14 5.49 16.12 1,788 2,429 234 
2008 15.69 25.39 5.65 11.9 696 679 318 
2009 14.3 23.11 4.72 9.05 1,661 1,262 435 
2010 10.86 22.57 4.62 7.74 1,471 1,093 624 
2011 9.92 24.37 4.23 7.66 910 733 683 
2012 13.17 24.5 5.02 8.55 1,543 946 702 
 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 8 shows the average foreign ownership in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
and non-SOEs for a period from 2007 to 2012. The first two columns present the value 
weighted average of foreign ownership (in percent) in SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. 
SOEs are listed firms in which the government is holding at least 50 percent of their 
outstanding shares. The next two columns show the equally weighted average of foreign 
ownership (in percent) in SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. The fifth and sixth columns 
are the average market capitalization of SOEs and non-SOEs, in VND thousand. The last 
column is the number of firms used for calculation. 
Table 8 provides a summary of foreign ownership for SOEs and non-SOEs. SOEs 
are listed firms in which the government holds at least 50 percent of firms’ outstanding 
shares. Firms where the holding of the government is less than 50 percent of outstanding 
shares are non-SOEs. The first two columns of the table present the value-weighted 
average of foreign ownership for SOEs and non-SOEs. The third and fourth columns of 
the table show the equally weighted average of foreign ownership. The equally weighted 
average is calculated by taking the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors in 
each firm, and then averaging this percentage across firms. The value weighted average 
is computed as the ratio of the total market value of all shares held by foreign investors 
divided by the total market capitalization of all firms.  
Table 8 shows the consistency of inverse relationship between government 
ownership and foreign ownership. In all years from 2007 to 2012, foreign ownership in 
non-SOEs is much higher than that in SOEs, verifying my hypothesis. Particularly, the 
value weighted average of foreign ownership in 2007 is 27.14 percent in non-SOEs while 
the corresponding value is 12.55 percent in SOEs. In addition, the value weighted average 
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of foreign ownership is higher than the equally weighted average of foreign ownership. 
This implies the strong preference of foreign investors in holding shares of large size 
firms, since the market capitalization of each firm is used as the weight. 
Table 8 shows the foreign ownership is higher calculated using firm market 
capitalization as the weight than equally weighted value. In the previous section, table 7 
shows the strong preference of foreign investors for large size firms. Table 8 indicates 
that in almost all of the years, the average firm size of SOEs is larger than the average 
firm size of non-SOEs. In 2012 the average firm size of SOEs is more than one and half 
times of average firm size of non-SOEs. The evidence indicates that even with larger size 
firms on average, SOEs still attract less foreign investment than non-SOEs which have 
smaller firm size on average. 
Due to the controlling of the government in SOEs, with the government ownership 
of at least 50 percent of firm’s shares, foreign ownership in SOEs is a proxy for a highly 
ownership concentration. The evidence in table 8 is also consistent with Dalhquist and 
Robertsson (2001) arguing that foreign investors want to avoid ownership concentration.  
To analyze in more detail, I rank the government ownership by quintiles, similarly 
to what I rank with the firm size. The results in Table 9 show that, foreign ownership is 
highest in the 4th quintile for 2011 with an average of government ownership is 46 
percent, and lowest in the 1st quintile with an average of government ownership of 0 
percent. 
Table 9 ranks the firms based on their percentage of government ownership at 
each year end from 2007 to 2012. The percentage of government ownership is the ratio 
of the number of common stocks held by the government divided by the total common 
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stocks outstanding of the firm. Firms are sorted into quintiles with the quintile 1 having 
the lowest and the quintile 5 with the highest government ownership. Panel A shows the 
weighted average percentage of foreign ownership, and panel B indicates the equally 
weighted average percentage of foreign ownership in each quintile. The average columns 
show the average percentage of foreign ownership in each year of the whole market. The 
last columns present the number of firms using in calculation. 
Table 9: Foreign ownership percentage and government ownership percentage, 
quintile analysis 
Panel A: Value weighted average of foreign ownership percentage by 
government ownership percentage quintiles 
Year 
Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Quintile 
5 
Average N 
2007 24.36 29.59 30.51 13.62 10.85 22.08 234 
2008 22.44 26.37 22.86 30.11 13.65 21.98 318 
2009 19.96 26.42 22.63 24.18 14.38 19.52 435 
2010 19.24 30.79 14.63 28.32 10.00 18.48 624 
2011 17.95 38.35 23.12 34.7 9.01 19.58 683 
2012 17.65 38.95 24.4 36.54 12.78 20.06 702 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted average of foreign ownership percentage by 
government ownership percentage quintiles 
Year 
Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Quintile 
5 
Average N 
2007 19.86 16.18 11.56 4.88 6.05 11.67 234 
2008 13.85 13.16 9.64 6.11 5.75 9.74 318 
2009 9.3 9.29 9.22 5.13 4.86 7.57 435 
2010 7.53 11.68 6.98 6.23 4.28 6.85 624 
2011 7.6 10.79 7.02 6.08 3.67 6.68 683 
2012 8.79 11.74 8.04 6.45 4.63 7.55 702 
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Table 9 indicates that when computing the value weighted foreign ownership 
using market capitalization as the weight, foreign ownership is lowest in the 5th quintile, 
higher in the second, third and fourth quintiles. When calculating average foreign 
ownership as equally weighted value, the results look more different, higher government 
ownership, lower foreign investment. One possible caveat with the quintile analysis of 
foreign ownership is that there are a lot of firms having the same government ownership 
percentage. Therefore, the number of observations in some quintiles is far different from 
each other. 
Existing literatures agree that SOEs are less efficient than non-SOEs. The 
management in SOEs is communist member and selected by governmental agencies. The 
benchmark of being selected is not a management talent, but a political issue. The wages 
and any compensation to the management in SOEs are regulated by the government, 
mostly based on the rank of the firm that is managed by the management and the ages 
and/or wage levels of the management. The wage level of a manager depends on his age 
(experience) and the position he is holding. If two firms are classified in the same rank, 
the CEOs of the two firms are paid quite similarly if they have the same experience. The 
firm’s performance is also a factor to determine the wages of the management, but this is 
only important in extreme circumstances, for instance, if the firm performs really badly. 
The information disclosure in SOEs is limited, the management has incentive to not 
declare their high wages and salary relative to overall income of state officials, and/or 
bad performance. 
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5.3. Foreign Ownership Percentage and Audit Firms 
The four audit firms running business in the market of Vietnam include KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, and Ernst and Young. These audit firms usually 
charge a higher audit fee than do domestic audit firms. However, those audit firms are 
well-known in the international audit service market. Some implications can be derived 
from this matter. First, in an emerging market such as Vietnam, the information disclosure 
standards are widely considered lower than those in a developed country. Most of foreign 
investors in Vietnam come from countries that are higher developed than Vietnam.  
The reputation of audit firms can imply the availability of transparency of the 
listed firms. Those audit firms have high reputation, so they are more likely to propose 
more reliable audit opinions. Second, due to those audit firms’ high reputation, auditors’ 
opinions may not be influenced by the management of audited firms. In addition, audit 
fees of those audit agencies are much higher than the other audits.  
Thus, firms where the internal control system is pretty good are more likely to 
hire these reputable audit firms. It can be implied that firms with a strong internal control 
system have a more transparency in information disclosure. Financial statements audited 
by them are written in both local language and English that foreign investors can easily 
examine. The evidence in table 10 indicates that foreign ownership is much higher in 
firms audited by a foreign audit firm than that in firms audited by a domestic audit agency.  
Table 10 shows the average foreign ownership in firms audited by a domestic 
audit firm and by a foreign audit firm for a period from 2007 to 2012. The first two 
columns of panel A present the value weighted average of foreign ownership (in percent) 
in firms audited by a domestic audit agency and by a foreign audit agency, respectively. 
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The next two columns show the equally weighted average of foreign ownership (in 
percent) in firms audited by a domestic audit firm and a foreign audit firm, respectively. 
The last three columns are the number of firms used for calculation. The superscripts, 
***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Panel B 
presents foreign ownership by firm size quintiles.  
Table 10: Foreign ownership percentage and audit companies 
Panel A: Foreign ownership percentage in firms listed on the Hanoi exchange and 
the Hochiminh exchange by year 
Year 
Foreign ownership average Number of observations 
Domestic 
 Audit  
Foreign  
Audit  
Difference 
Domestic 
 Audit  
Foreign  
Audit  
Total 
2007 10.53 16.72 6.19 191 43 234 
2008 8.63 15.04 6.41 263 55 318 
2009 6.15 13.42 7.27** 350 85 435 
2010 5.18 13.96 8.78*** 506 119 624 
2011 4.98 13.65 8.67*** 549 134 683 
2012 5.41 15.79 10.38*** 557 145 702 
                                       
Panel B: Foreign ownership percentage in firms audited by foreign audits and 
domestic audits by firm size quintiles 
Firm size 
 quintiles 
Value weighted foreign 
ownership 
Equally  weighted foreign 
ownership 
N 
Domestic 
 Audit  
Foreign  
Audit  
Domestic 
 Audit  
Foreign  
Audit  
 
Quintile 1 2.69 0.49 2.62 0.54  600 
Quintile 2 3.59 2.30 3.17 3.13  599 
Quintile 3 6.54 10.13 5.40 9.43  598 
Quintile 4 9.73 10.15 8.69 9.48  599 
Quintile 5 17.77 22.25 16.35 19.93  600 
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The table summarizes the average percentage of foreign ownership in firms 
audited by a foreign audit company and in firms audited by a domestic audit company. 
The equally weighted average is calculated by taking the percentage of shares owned by 
foreign investors in each firm, and then averaging this percentage across firms. The value 
weighted average is computed as the ratio of the total market value of all shares held by 
foreign investors divided by the total market capitalization of all firms.  
For each category, the weighted foreign ownership is higher than the equally 
foreign ownership. This implies that foreign investors bias large size firms. In 2012, the 
weighted average holding in foreign investors in firms audited by foreign audits is 21.51 
percent, while the corresponding measure is 11.42 percent in firms audited by domestic 
audits. Similarly, the equally foreign ownership is 15.79 percent in firms audited by 
foreign audits and 5.41 percent (about a little more than one third) in firms audited by 
local audits. The differences between the foreign ownership average of firms audited by 
a foreign audit company and that of firms audited by a local audit company are 
statistically significant for years from 2009 to 2012. 
 
5.4. Foreign Ownership Percentage and the Stock Exchange on Which the Firm 
is Listed 
In the previous section, the evidence shows the preference of foreign investors for 
Hochiminh city and provinces around it, called region 5. Hochiminh city is the largest 
economic center in Vietnam and is considered the most active economic area of the 
country. In this section, I compare the foreign ownership of firms listed on the Hochiminh 
exchange with that of firms listed on the Hanoi exchange. 
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Table 11: Foreign ownership percentage and the stock exchange on which the 
firm is listed 
Year 
Foreign ownership average Number of observations 
Listed Hanoi 
Listed 
HCM 
Difference 
Listed 
Hanoi 
Listed 
HCM 
Total 
2007 4.03 17.88 13.85*** 105 129 234 
2008 3.57 15.83 12.26*** 158 160 318 
2009 3.42 13.11 9.69*** 249 186 435 
2010 3.51 11.35 7.84*** 358 266 624 
2011 3.68 10.60 6.92*** 387 296 683 
2012 4.68 11.23 6.55*** 394 308 702 
       
 
 
Table 11 shows the average foreign ownership in firms listed on the Hanoi 
exchange and Hochiminh exchange for a period from 2007 to 2012. The first three 
columns show the equally weighted average of foreign ownership (in percent) in firms 
listed on the Hanoi exchange and the Hochiminh exchange, and the mean difference, 
respectively. The superscripts, ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. The last three columns are the number of firms used for 
calculation. 
Table 11 shows that the foreign ownership in firms listed on the Hochiminh stock 
exchange is consistently higher than foreign ownership in firms listed on the Hanoi stock 
exchange. The Hochiminh exchange was established in 2000 while the Hanoi stock 
exchange was launched in 2005.  The foreign ownership of firms listed on the Hochiminh 
exchange is consistently greater than that of firms listed on the Hanoi exchange.  
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The evidence shows the consistency with the hypothesis that the size requirement 
for firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange is larger than that for firms listed on Hanoi 
exchange. And also, the requirement of minimum number of share concentration that is 
different between the two exchanges. All of the mean differences in the Panel A are 
statistically significant. In further analysis in the next section, I will control for the size 
effect.  
 
5.5. Regression Results 
In this section, I present the regression results of the empirical model. Foreign 
ownership is regressed on several attributes of firms during the period from 2007 to 2012. 
The last column of table 12 presents the regression results using the pool of all variables 
of all years. The results show that foreign investors are not fond of investing in firms with 
high systematic risk (beta), high leverage, high volatility, high dividend yield, listed on 
Hanoi stock exchange, especially high government ownership and high turnover rate. The 
results are consistent with Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and other literature finding 
that foreign investors invest more in large size firms. Surprisingly, firms audited by 
foreign audit agencies have lower foreign ownership than firms audited by local audit 
agencies. But the result on this variable is not robust. The regression results are not 
consistent with previous quintile analysis of foreign audit variable. 
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All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The dependent variable is 
ForeignOwn. Numbers in parentheses represent the p-values for a t-test that the average 
t-statistic is zero. The generalized linear model (GLM) with a logit link and the binomial 
family is used to estimate the model. The robust option is included in the GLM model to 
obtain robust standard errors. The year dummies and industry-specific dummies are 
included in the pooled regression for robustness. The superscripts, ***, **, and * denote 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
The coefficients of government ownership, horizon time the firm listed until each 
year end, and market capitalization are all statistically significant at zero percent, and 
support the maintained hypotheses: foreign investors invest more in firms having less 
government ownership, large size firms, and firms having been listed for longer time so 
the information about the firms is more available and more transparent. The evidence 
shows that leverage has negative influence on foreign holding, but only significant in 1 
year. The coefficients of firms audited by foreign audit agencies and current ratio are not 
significant and swift the signs in some years. 
The result is consistent with the prediction about dividend. Dividend was not 
taxed before 2010, but taxed since January 1st 2010. The coefficient has been only 
negative and robust at 5 percent and 1 percent since 2010. This implies that the tax policy 
on dividend affects the holding of foreign investors. When investors have to pay tax on 
dividends, they hold less. 
Turnover rate, surprisingly has a consistently negative relationship with foreign 
ownership suggesting that firms having relative high volume traded have low foreign 
ownership at year end. This evidence is different from findings of Kang and Stulz (1997) 
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and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) who find a strong positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and turnover rate. A possible explanation is the results of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980). Their study formalizes the important link between market 
microstructure and asset pricing and shows that, in equilibrium, illiquid assets would be 
held by investors with longer investment horizons. Another possible explanation is the 
findings of Blanco (2013). He concludes that investment into frontier markets aims to 
obtain long-term profits from current account surpluses arising from the exploitation of 
natural resources. Vietnam is classified as a frontier market. 
 
5.6. Panel Regression 
In this section, I use panel data to perform a regression of the dependent variable 
on several explanatory variables. Since foreign ownership ranges from 0 to 49 percent, I 
use Kang and Stulz (1997) dependent variable to examine the whole market as well as 
each market separately. This method focuses on the deviation of the portfolio held by 
foreign investors from the market portfolio. The dependent variable is the difference 
between the foreign ownership in each firm at a year end and the equally-weighted 
average of foreign ownership for that year. Thus, the dependent variable, yi,t, measures 
how the foreign ownership percentage in a firm differs from what it would be if foreign 
investors had acquired the same fraction of each firm. 
Table 13 presents the regression results using the panel data for the period from 
2007 to 2012. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Numbers in parentheses 
represent the p-values for a t-test that the average t-statistic is zero. The fixed effect 
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models are used as the Hausman test results reject the Null. The superscripts, ***, **, 
and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
Table 13: Exchange effect analysis 
  
Model 1 
Overal market 
Model 2 
Hanoi Exchange 
Model 3 
HCM Exchange 
 
TurnOverRate 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  
 [0.806] [0.466] [0.825]  
DummyForeignAudit 0.0045 0.0188** 0.0017  
 [0.616] [0.033] [0.893]  
MarketToBook -0.0021 -0.0012 -0.0011  
 [0.085] [0.147] [0.729]  
Beta -0.0139*** -0.0127*** -0.0117  
 [0.009] [0.003] [0.231]  
CurrentRatio 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0036*  
 [0.426] [0.271] [0.091]  
DummyListedHanoi 0.0104   
 
 [0.387]   
 
Size 0.0379*** 0.0154*** 0.0560***  
 [0] [0] [0]  
Log(IPOAge) 0.0324*** 0.0170*** 0.0523***  
 [0] [0] [0]  
Volatility -0.0027 -0.0087*** 0.0046  
 [0.371] [0] [0.366]  
Return -0.0002*** 0.00005** -0.0003***  
 [0] [0.014] [0]  
Leverage 0.000012 0.000009 0.000024  
 [0.43] [0.39] [0.415]  
DividendYield -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006  
 [0.494] [0.453] [0.182]  
GovernmentOwn -0.0007** -0.0006*** -0.0009  
 [0.034] [0] [0.151]  
_cons -0.7069*** -0.2752*** -1.0841***  
 [0] [0] [0]  
No observations 1803 883 920  
R-squared 0.3679 0.1737 0.3667  
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Model 1 reflects the regression results of the overall market while model 2 
presents the results for the Hanoi stock exchange, and model 3 shows the results for the 
Hochiminh stock exchange. The results presented in Table 6 are fixed effects if the 
Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect and random effect are significantly different. 
The evidence from model 1 reveals that foreign investors show a preference for 
large firms, firms with lower return16, lower beta, lower government ownership, and firms 
that are listed longer on the stock exchange. Firm size and firm age continue to be strongly 
positively significant at zero percent for all models. The coefficient of the variable 
government ownership is negative and significant at 5 percent in Model 1, while it is 
consistently significant at zero percent in Table 12. 
It is interesting that the government ownership coefficient is significant for the 
Hanoi stock exchange, but no longer significant for the Hochiminh stock exchange, while 
still remains the negative sign for both exchanges. The evidence implies that foreign 
investors discriminate between the two exchanges in term of government ownership 
percentage. 
In particular, models 2 and 3 show that foreign investors hold disproportionately 
more shares of firms audited by a prestigious foreign audit company and firms with lower 
systematic risk, but the result is pronounced only for the Hanoi exchange. While the 
coefficient of Volatility is negatively significant at 1 percent level for the Hanoi exchange, 
it is positive and insignificant for the Hochiminh exchange. Average firm size of the 
                                                 
16 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) propose the overreaction effect and the strategy involved buying loser and 
selling winner portfolios. They define stocks as winners or losers based on their total returns over the 
previous 3 to 5 years and find that the loser portfolios outperformed the market, while the winner portfolios 
underperformed the market. The evidence in Table 12 shows that foreign investors invest more in firms 
with lower past returns, implying a trend of buying and holding the losers.  
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Hochiminh exchange is larger than the average firm size of the Hanoi exchange.  Firms 
listed on the Hanoi exchange have higher price volatility than firms listed on the 
Hochiminh exchange. Foreign investors prefer firms with lower volatility on the Hanoi 
exchange. 
The coefficient of CurrentRatio is positively significant for the Hochiminh 
exchange, while negative and insignificant for the Hanoi exchange. One possible reason 
for the negative relationship in the Hanoi exchange but the positive relationship in the 
Hochiminh exchange is the differences of financial position of firms listed on those 
markets. High levels of CurrentRatio imply low short-term distress risk.  
Firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange have strong financial positions, so 
foreign investors hold more in firms with higher CurrentRatio. Firms listed on the Hanoi 
exchange face higher levels of short-term distress. Foreign investors prefer holding stakes 
in firms with higher CurrentRatio, hence the negative coefficient for the Hanoi exchange, 
where the firms are on average weak. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient of 
Turnover rate is relatively small and almost the same in the three models, in which the 
coefficient is equal around 0.01 to 0.02 percent. 
The panel data regression results provide some implications. First, besides 
information asymmetry, financial condition of the firms is of concern when foreign 
investors allocate their portfolios. Second, government ownership, a proxy for political 
risk, systematic risk and individual firm risk factors have less influence on foreign 
investors in a more developed exchange. In this sample, the government ownership 
variable is negatively significant for the Hanoi exchange, while insignificant for the 
Hochiminh exchange. On the Hochiminh exchange volatility does not adversely affect 
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foreign ownership stakes. Third, firm size and firm age have a strong influence on foreign 
investors’ wealth allocation.  The larger the firm or the longer the firm has been listed, 
the higher is the foreign ownership percentage. 
 
5.7. Foreign Ownership Percentage and Turnover Rate 
Kang and Stulz (1996) among other studies have found a positively significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and turnover rate in developed countries. 
Turnover rate is the ratio between total shares traded during the year and the total shares 
outstanding at the end of each year. This attribute can have a role as a proxy for market 
liquidity. The more frequently the share is traded, the higher foreign ownership the stock 
has. 
Table 14 summarizes the foreign ownership in several turnover rate quintiles. The 
firms in each year are sorted by their turnover rate into five quintiles with quintile 1 
having smallest and quintile 5 having largest turnover rate. Panel A shows that foreign 
holdings percentage in the largest turnover rate quintile are consistently lower than 
average foreign ownership percentage every year. In addition, foreign ownership 
percentage for the 5th turnover rate quintile is smaller than that for the first and second 
turnover rate quintiles in most years. 
Foreign ownership is 7.24 percent for the 5th quintile. The corresponding value is 
14.11 percent for the first quintile and 15.24 percent for the second quintile in 2007. The 
evidence shows that foreign ownership percentage is relatively high for the first and 
second turnover rate quintiles. The findings contradict results from existing studies, based 
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on developed markets that find the turnover rate is positively associated with foreign 
ownership percentage. 
Panel B of the table summarizes foreign ownership percentage for the five 
turnover rate quintiles excluding the effect of firm size. Firms are first sorted by market 
capitalization into five quintiles, with the first quintile having lowest market 
capitalization while the 5th quintile having highest market capitalization. The firms in 
each firm size quintile are then sorted by turnover rate. 
 
Table 14: Turnover rate and foreign ownership percentage 
Panel A: Yearly average of foreign ownership by turnover rate quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Average N 
2007 14.11 15.24 13.42 12.21 7.24 12.45 212 
2008 12.49 10.50 9.19 10.13 7.03 9.87 307 
2009 6.41 9.06 7.94 7.40 7.13 7.59 434 
2010 10.77 8.47 6.60 4.41 4.00 6.85 624 
2011 8.97 8.22 5.68 4.58 5.99 6.69 682 
2012 7.41 8.70 7.20 7.78 6.72 7.56 701 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted average of foreign ownership by turnover rate quintiles 
controlling for firm size effects 
Firm size  
quintiles 
Turnover Rate quintiles     
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Average N 
Quintile1 1.93 2.52 2.25 2.46 3.68 2.57 592 
Quintile2 2.26 3.08 3.14 4.47 3.01 3.19 593 
Quintile3 8.49 5.37 5.03 5.76 5.45 6.02 590 
Quintile4 11.00 9.05 7.28 10.40 6.87 8.92 594 
Quintile5 17.55 18.12 17.92 19.92 18.22 18.35 591 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
The results show that for the smaller firms, foreign owners prefer market liquidity 
in the stocks that they own. However, for the largest firm size quintile, turnover rate is 
not positively correlated with foreign ownership percentage. However, for the third and 
fourth firm size quintiles, foreign ownership percentage of the smallest turnover rate 
quintile is much higher than that of the largest turnover rate quintile. 
5.8. Size Bias Examination 
Kang and Stulz (1997) analyze the size bias using export rate and turnover rate of 
Japan market. In this dissertation, the export data of each firm is not available; I use the 
dummy variables indicating if the firm is listed in Hanoi exchange, if the firm is audited 
by an international audit agency, and government ownership for my analysis. The 
methodology is as follow: for each year during period of 2007-2012, the firms are divided 
into size quintiles, quintile 1 is the smallest quintile, and quintile 5 is the largest quintile. 
Then, each size quintile is divided into five quintiles based on government ownership, or 
into 2 groups one listed in Hanoi exchange and the other listed in Hochiminh exchange, 
and one audited by local audit firms and the other audited by an international audit firm. 
 
5.8.1. Size and The Exchange on Which the Firm is Listed 
This subsection tries to explain the effect of the exchange on which the firm is 
listed on the firm’s foreign ownership, excluding the effect of firm size.  
Table 15 provides evidence of foreigners’ preference for firms listed on the 
Hochiminh exchange after controlling for firm size effects. The table shows that, foreign 
holdings in firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange are consistently higher than those in 
firms listed on the Hanoi exchange. In particular, the foreign ownership percentage is 
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almost doubled for firms listed on the Hochiminh exchange for every firm size quintile. 
For example, for the largest firm size quintile, foreign ownership is 20.07 percent for the 
Hochiminh exchange, and 11.46 percent for the Hanoi exchange. The smallest firm size 
quintile result is even more pronounced with foreign ownership for the Hochiminh 
exchange of 5.92 percent and foreign ownership for the Hanoi exchange of 2.40 percent. 
 
Table 15: Foreign ownership and the exchange on which the firm is listed 
Firm size 
quintiles 
Value  weighted  foreign 
ownership percentage 
Equally  weighted  foreign 
ownership percentage N 
Hanoi Hochiminh Hanoi Hochiminh 
Quintile 1 2.17 7.78 2.4 5.92 600 
Quintile 2 2.19 6.36 2.28 5.66 599 
Quintile 3 5.29 8.81 4.94 7.07 598 
Quintile 4 4.34 12.41 4.98 10.76 599 
Quintile 5 17.36 22.28 11.46 20.07 600 
 
There are two possible reasons. First, because foreign investors do not like the 
ownership concentration. Each exchange has different requirement of ownership 
concentration: in Hochiminh exchange, at least 20 percent of the firm’s total voting shares 
are held by at least 100 shareholders, while for firms listed on Hanoi exchange, the 
counterpart is 15 percent. Second, Hochiminh city is more attractive to originally 
Vietnamese foreign investors who are more familiar with Hochiminh than with Hanoi. 
 
5.8.2. Size and the Government Ownership Percentage 
This subsection tries to explain the effect of the government ownership in a firm 
on the firm’s foreign ownership, excluding the effect of firm size. I analyze both the value 
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weighted average government ownership and the equally weighted government 
ownership. The calculation of equally weighted and value weighted average government 
ownership is similar to the calculation in the previous sections. 
 
Table 16: Foreign ownership percentage and government ownership percentage 
excluding firm size effects. 
Panel A: Value weighted average of foreign ownership percentage by government 
ownership percentage quintiles 
Firm size 
 quintiles 
Government ownership percentage quintiles 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 N 
Quintile 1 3.3 3.08 3.49 1.82 1.75 600 
Quintile 2 2.86 5.55 5.76 2.44 1.31 599 
Quintile 3 11.51 9.63 5.47 4.55 1.96 598 
Quintile 4 11.13 18.21 12.31 8.38 3.6 599 
Quintile 5 20.63 33.09 32.68 32.27 12.47 600 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted average of foreign ownership percentage by 
government ownership percentage quintiles 
Firm size 
quintiles 
Government ownership percentage quintiles 
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 N 
Quintile 
1 
3.36 2.88 2.59 1.81 2.32 600 
Quintile 
2 
3.14 4.48 5.14 2.1 1.37 599 
Quintile 
3 
9.26 7.15 5.41 4.21 2.00 598 
Quintile 
4 
10.95 14.85 10.44 7.18 3.06 599 
Quintile 
5 
15.94 31.88 26.82 19.66 10.94 600 
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Table 16 shows that, controlling for size, foreign investors invest less in firms 
with relatively high government ownership. For most of firm size quintiles, the foreign 
ownership percentage is lowest in the firms with the highest government ownership 
quintile. In each firm size quintile, the foreign ownership percentage appears higher in 
the 2nd and 3rd government ownership quintiles, but lower in the 4th and 5th government 
ownership quintiles. The first government ownership quintiles in every firm size quintile 
have zero percent of government ownership. Although the foreign ownership percentage 
in those quintiles is higher than the foreign ownership in the 4th and 5th government 
ownership quintiles, it is lower than the foreign ownership percentage in the 2nd and 3rd 
government ownership quintiles where the government ownership ranges between 1 
percent and 40 percent. This implies that foreign ownership is highest if the government 
ownership in the firm is from 1 percent to 40 percent, it is lower in firms without 
government ownership, but lowest in firms having a government ownership of 50 percent 
or more (the 5th government ownership quintiles), controlling firm size effects.  
5.8.3. Firm Size and Audit Agencies 
Table 17: Foreign ownership and audit services excluding firm size effects. 
Firm size 
quintiles 
Value weighted foreign 
ownership percentage 
Equally weighted foreign 
ownership percentage 
N 
Domestic Audit Foreign Audit Domestic Audit Foreign Audit 
Quintile 1 2.69 0.49 2.62 0.54 600 
Quintile 2 3.59 2.3 3.17 3.13 599 
Quintile 3 6.54 10.13 5.4 9.43 598 
Quintile 4 9.73 10.15 8.69 9.48 599 
Quintile 5 17.77 22.25 16.35 19.93 600 
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Table 17 provides the summary of the audit agency effects on the foreign 
ownership in each firm size quintile firms. The evidence shows the preference of foreign 
investors in firms audited by an international audit agency in large size firms. Firms sorted 
in the 5th quintile have largest market capitalization while firms sorted in the first quintile 
have lowest market capitalization. In each firm size quintile, firms are then sorted into 
two categories, firms audited by a domestic audit company and firms audited by an 
international audit company including KPMG, Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 
Ernst and Young.  
In the first firm size quintile, the value weighted average of foreign ownership 
percentage in a firm audited by a domestic audit company is 2.69 while the corresponding 
percentage in a firm audited by an international audit firm is 0.49. In the 2nd firm size 
quintile, the corresponding percentages are 3.59 and 2.30. However, from the 3rd firm 
size quintile, the foreign ownership percentage in firms audited by an international audit 
company exceeds the foreign ownership percentage in firms audited by a domestic audit 
company.  
In the 5th firm size quintile, foreign ownership percentage in firms audited by an 
international audit company is 22.25 percent while the foreign ownership percentage in 
firms audited by a domestic company is 17.77 percent. The evidence implies that for 
small firms, the attribute of an audit company does not influence the preference of foreign 
investors; however, in large size firms, foreign investors are more likely to invest in firms 
audited by an international audit company.   
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5.9. Firm Location Effects  
The geography of Vietnam is long but narrow. The area of Vietnam is around 
128,066 square miles, while the distance from Hanoi (in the north) to Hochiminh (in the 
south) is 712 miles. Because of historical and geographic effects17, I classify the area of 
Vietnam into two sub areas, Hanoi area and Hochiminh area. The Hanoi area is the area 
from Danang northward, the Hochiminh area is the area from Danang southward. The 
Hanoi area is exactly the same as the north region, and the Hochiminh area is exactly the 
same as the south region in the previous sections.  
The data of 2012 show that 500 out of 702 listed firms are listed in their location 
areas, i.e., firms located in the Hanoi area are listed on the Hanoi stock exchange while 
firms located in the Hochiminh area are listed on the Hochiminh stock exchange. The 
evidence supports Degryse and Ongena (2005) findings. 
 
                                                 
17 Appendix H shows the geography of Vietnam that is long and narrow. 
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Table 18 implies that firms located in the Hochiminh area have relatively more 
foreign ownership than firms located in the Hanoi area. In all the years, the number of 
listed firms in the Hanoi area is lower than the number of listed firms in the Hochiminh 
area. The average firm size in the Hanoi area is a little smaller than that in the Hochiminh 
area. However, the average foreign ownership, both equally weighted values and market 
capitalization weighted value, is much lower in the Hanoi area than in the Hochiminh 
area. 
 Particularly, in 2007, the equally weighted foreign ownership of firms located in 
the Hochinh area is 15.34 percent, almost 2.5 times the correspondence of firms located 
in the Hanoi area. The evidence indicates the preference of foreign investors in firms 
located in the Hochiminh area, the economic center of Vietnam and more familiar with 
capitalism than the Hanoi area.  
The evidence of table 18 supports previous results suggesting that foreign 
investors hold more proportionate in firms listed on the Hochiminh stock exchange. Most 
of the firms located in the Hochiminh area are listed on the Hochiminh stock exchange, 
and on average, the foreign ownership of firms located in the Hochiminh area is much 
larger than that of firms located in the Hanoi area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation investigates foreign investors’ holdings in the frontier market of 
Vietnam where the stock exchanges have grown rapidly. The two exchanges have grown 
at different rates due to differences in geography, historical and political factors. 
Consequently there are differential rates of foreign ownership in firms listed on the two 
exchanges. Firms tend to list on the exchange closer to their headquarters.  
Foreign ownership percentage for firms listed on Hochiminh exchange is 
impressively higher than foreign ownership percentage for firms listed on Hanoi 
exchange. Foreign ownership percentage is strongly negatively correlated with volatility 
for Hanoi exchange, while it is insignificantly positively correlated with volatility for 
Hochiminh exchange. Similarly, beta, domestic audit services and government ownership 
are negatively and significantly correlated with foreign ownership percentage for Hanoi, 
but insignificant for Hochiminh. This implies that the risk, including of political risk, firm 
risk and market risk, is more pronounced for firms located closer to the political center 
and with a more volatile economy. It also implies that as the information disclosure 
standard is lower, foreigners depend more on the opinions of more reliable auditors.  
The coefficients of firm size and firm age since IPO are consistently robust. 
Foreign investors invest more in firms with lower government ownership. Average firm 
size is higher for SOEs and foreign investors strongly prefer investing in large firms. 
However, foreign investors strongly show their preference for investing in firms other 
than SOEs.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 19: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
ForeignOwn  The percentage of shares held by foreign owner(s) at year end 
TurnOverRate The total number of shares traded in a year, scaled by the total 
shares at the end of fiscal year  
GovernmentOwn  The percentage of shares held by the government at year end 
DummyForeignAudit A dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm is audited by one 
of the four international audit firms including KPMG, 
Deloitte, Ernst and Young, and PricewaterhouseCoopers,  
and 0 otherwise  
MarketToBook  Market price divided by the book value of a share at year end  
Beta The beta coefficient for the market model, estimated using 
daily returns 
Return The cumulative return during 52 weeks of daily stock return  
Volatility  The standard deviation of a firm’s return using a daily basis 
CurrentRatio  Current assets scaled by current liabilities at year end  
DividendYield The dividend per share as a percentage of the share price 
Leverage  Total liabilities divided by total equity 
DummyListedHN A dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm is listed on the 
Hanoi exchange  and 0 otherwise  
Size  The logarithm of total market capitalization at year end  
Log(IPOAge)  The logarithm of the firm age since IPO  
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APPENDIX A: (CONTINUED) 
FDIpercapita The accumulated FDI at year end of each province divided 
by the year end population of that province. 
FDIpercapita_1 The accumulated FDI at the last year end of each province 
divided by the last year end population of that province. 
Bed The average number of hospital beds of each province for 
each 1,000 people of that province. Patient bed is used for 
patients during their treatment at the health establishments. 
This excludes beds for persons on duty, and beds in the 
examining and waiting rooms 
Doctor The average number of medical doctors of each province for 
each 1,000 people of that province. 
TotalDoctor The average number of medical doctors, midwives, physician 
and nurses of each province for each 1,000 people of that 
province. 
TotalStudent The average number of primary, secondary, and high school 
students of each province for each 1,000 people of that 
province. 
Budget The yearly government budget collection from tax divided by 
the population of each province. 
PCI18 The Provincial competitiveness index of each province. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Appendix B describes the methodology of constructing the provincial competitiveness index. 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIONS OF PCI CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY 
 
 
PCI, provincial competitiveness index, is designed to assess the ease of doing 
business, economic governance, and administrative reform efforts by local governments 
of 63 provinces and cities in Vietnam. PCI is created by the PCI Team, led by Dr. Edmund 
Malesky, associate Professor of Political Economy at Duke University, under the support 
of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and The United States Agency for 
International Development. The team collects business survey data, calculates ten sub-
indices and standardizes to a 10-point scale, then calibrates the composite PCI as the 
weighted mean of mean of the ten sub-indices with a maximum score of 100 points.  
A province that is considered to perform well on the PCI is the one that has: 1) 
low entry costs for business start-up; 2) easy access to land and security of business 
premises; 3) a transparent business environment and equitable business information; 4) 
minimal informal charges; 5) has limited time requirements for bureaucratic procedures 
and inspections; 6) limited the crowding out of private activity from policy biases toward 
state, foreign, or connected firms; 7) proactive and creative provincial leadership in 
solving problems for enterprises; 8) developed and high-quality business support 
services; 9) sound labor training policies; and 10) fair and effective legal procedures for 
dispute resolution. 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 20: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY PARTNERS IN 
VIETNAM (ACCUMULATION OF PROJECTS STILL VALID AS OF 12/31/2012) 
 
 
No Investment Partners 
Number of  
Projects 
Total Registered 
 invested capital 
(USD Million) 
1  Japan 1,849 28,699.62 
2  Taiwan 2,234 27,129.09 
3  Singapore                      1,119 24,875.35 
4  South Korea 3,197 24,815.96 
5  British Virgin Islands           510 15,386.37 
6  Hong Kong 705 11,966.69 
7  The United State of America 648 10,507.19 
8  Malaysia                       435 10,196.42 
9  Cayman Islands                 54 7,505.99 
10  Thailand 298 6,063.69 
11  Netherlands                     177 5,910.08 
12  Brunei                         131 4,800.98 
13  China 893 4,697.22 
14  Canada                         128 4,689.05 
15  Samoa                          95 3,878.70 
16  France 381 3,142.72 
17  United Kingdom                161 2,617.28 
18  Switzerland 92 2,000.72 
19  Luxembourg                     24 1,501.66 
20  Australia                       276 1,313.23 
21  Russia 86 1,056.03 
22  Germany 196 1,053.70 
23  British West Indies            6 987.00 
24  Cyprus 12 941.02 
25  Denmark 104 632.82 
26  Finland 8 336.22 
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APPENDIX C: (CONTINUED) 
 
27  Indonesia                      34 285.12 
28  Philippines                    64 284.35 
29  Italy                      49 257.18 
30  India 68 251.36 
31  Slovakia                       5 235.47 
32  Mauritius                      34 232.19 
33  Bermuda                        5 211.57 
34  Cook Islands                   3 142.00 
35 Belgium                             41 134.74 
36  United Arab Emirates 6 134.60 
37  Norway 30 113.98 
38  Channel Islands                14 113.98 
39  Bahamas                        3 108.65 
40  Poland 10 99.74 
41  New Zealand                    18 76.39 
42  Belize                         9 71.70 
43  Isle of Man                    2 70.00 
44  Turkey 9 68.80 
45  Barbados                       2 68.14 
46  Laos 8 66.75 
47  Sweden 31 65.79 
48  Czech Republic 26 63.46 
49  Austria 21 60.17 
50  Cambodia 12 53.62 
51  Panama                         9 51.02 
52  Hungary                        12 47.29 
53  Macau                         8 45.20 
54  Saint Kitts and Nevis            2 39.69 
55  Liechtenstein                  2 35.50 
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APPENDIX C: (CONTINUED) 
56  Israel                         14 30.98 
57  Bulgaria                    7 29.86 
58  Spain 29 29.37 
59  Seychelles Republic                  7 28.60 
60  Ukraine                      12 27.29 
61  Iraq 2 27.10 
62  Ecuador                        1 20.86 
63  Costa Rica                     1 16.45 
64  Kenya                          1 16.00 
65  Saint Vincent                  1 16.00 
66  Sri Lanka                    9 13.94 
67  Dominica                       2 11.00 
68  St Vincent and The Grenadines    2 9.00 
69  Cuba                          1 6.60 
70  Island of Nevis                1 6.00 
71  Ireland                        8 5.91 
72  Oman                           1 5.00 
73  Slovenia                       3 3.25 
74  Turks and Caicos Islands         2 3.10 
75  Brazil                         1 2.60 
76  Nigeria                        18 2.27 
77  Guatemala                      1 1.87 
78  Pakistan                       8 1.68 
79  Serbia                         1 1.58 
80  Islands of Marshall              1 1.50 
81  Romania 2 1.40 
82  North Korea 5 1.20 
83  Guinea Bissau                  1 1.19 
84  Kyrgyz Republic               1 1.10 
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APPENDIX C: (CONTINUED) 
 
85  Syria                          3 1.10 
86  Morocco 1 1.00 
87  Maurice                        1 1.00 
88  Lebanon 4 0.81 
89  Guam                           1 0.50 
90  Egypt 1 0.40 
91  Bangladesh                     1 0.20 
92  South Africa 3 0.18 
93  Argentina                      1 0.12 
94  Uruguay                        1 0.10 
95  West Indies                    1 0.10 
96  Malta                           1 0.05 
97  Mexico                         1 0.05 
98  Estonia                        1 0.05 
99  Sierra Leone                   1 0.04 
100  Iran                           1 0.01 
  Total 14,522 210,521.65 
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APPENDIX D: TABLE 21: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY SECTORS IN 
VIETNAM (ACCUMULATION OF PROJECTS STILL VALID AS OF 12/31/2012) 
 
 
Sectors 
Number of  
projects 
Total registered 
invested capital 
 (USD Million)  
Manufacturing and processing industry 8,072 105,938.68 
Real estate business 388 49,760.50 
Accommodation and food service 331 10,605.80 
Construction 936 10,052.02 
Production and distribution of electricity, gas, water, air 
conditioning  87 7,488.88 
Information and Communication 828 3,941.72 
Art and Entertainment 137 3,629.18 
Transport, storage 350 3,492.83 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery   493 3,263.03 
Mining 78 3,182.03 
Wholesale, retail and repair 902 2,898.27 
Finance, Banking and Insurance  76 1,321.65 
Water supply and waste treatment 28 1,234.19 
Health and social support 82 1,222.21 
Professional, science and technology Activities   1,336 1,101.55 
Others services 121 732.91 
Education and training 163 462.92 
Administration and support services   114 193.29 
Total 14,522 210,521.65 
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APPENDIX E: TABLE 22: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY FORMS IN 
VIETNAM (ACCUMULATION OF PROJECTS STILL VALID AS OF 12/31/2012) 
 
 
No. Investment form 
Number of 
projects 
 Total registered-invested  
capital (USD Million) 
1 
100percentage foreign-invested 
capital  11,499 141,402.88 
2 Venture 2,597 53,349.66 
3 BTO,BOT,BT Contracts19  14 5,857.32 
4 Business cooperation contracts   217 5,137.09 
5 Stock company     194 4,676.69 
6 Conglomerate company 1 98.01 
  Total 14,522 210,521.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 According to the Law on Investment (2005) of Vietnam, Build-transfer-operate contract (BTO) means 
the investment form signed by a competent State body and an investor in order to construct an infrastructure 
facility; and, upon completion of construction, the investor shall transfer the facility to the State of Vietnam 
and the government shall grant the investor the right to operate commercially such facility for a fixed 
duration in order to recover the invested capital and gain profits.   
 
Build-operate-transfer contract (BOT) means the investment form signed by a competent state body and an 
investor in order to construct and operate commercially an infrastructure facility for a fixed duration; and, 
upon expiry of the duration, the investor shall, without compensation, transfer such facility to the State of 
Vietnam. 
 
Build-transfer contract (BT) means the investment form signed by a competent State body and an investor 
in order to construct an infrastructure facility; and, upon completion of construction, the investor shall 
transfer the facility to the State of Vietnam and the government shall create conditions for the investor to 
implement another project in order to recover the invested capital and gain profits or to make a payment to 
the investor in accordance with an agreement in the BT contract. 
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 23: THE DESCRIPTIONS OF REGIONS IN VIETNAM 
 
 
Region 1 The Red River Delta region comprising of the capital and 10 provinces 
surrounding the capital of Vietnam. By year end of 2012, the population 
of the region was 20.237 million and the monthly average income per 
capita at current prices was VND 2.304 million 
 
Region 2 Northern midlands and mountain areas including 14 provinces. By year 
end of 2012, the population of the region was 11.4 million and the 
monthly average income per capita at current prices was VND 1.285 
million 
 
Region 3 North Central and Central coastal areas including 14 provinces in the 
middle of Vietnam. By year end of 2012, the population of the region 
was 5.38 million and the monthly average income per capita at current 
prices was VND 1.469 million 
 
Region 4 Central Highlands including 5 provinces in the mountainous middle 
west of Vietnam. By year end of 2012, the population of the region was 
19.174  million and the monthly average income per capita at current 
prices was VND 1.631 million 
 
Region 5 South East including Hochiminh City and 5 provinces in the southeast 
of Vietnam. This is the most active area in Vietnam. By year end of 
2012, the population of the region was 15.192 million and the monthly 
average income per capita at current prices was VND 3.241 million 
 
Region 6 Mekong River Delta including 13 provinces in the southwest of 
Vietnam. By year end of 2012, the population of the region was 17.391 
million and the monthly average income per capita at current prices was 
VND 1.785 million 
 
South The south half of Vietnam, including Hochiminh city and other 31 
provinces. By year end of 2012, the population of the region was 46.946 
million, accounting for 52.90 percent the population of Vietnam. The 
south comprises region 4, region 5, region 6, and the half of region 3. 
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APPENDIX G: TABLE 24: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY 
PROVINCES/CITIES IN VIETNAM (ACCUMULATION  
OF PROJECTS STILL VALID AS OF 12/31/2012) 
 
No. Provinces/Cities 
Number of  
projects 
 Total registered- 
invested capital  
(USD million)  
1 Ho Chi Minh City 4,337 32,403.22 
2 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 287 26,297.96 
3 Ha Noi 2,456 21,205.57 
4 Dong Nai 1,101 19,945.42 
5 Binh Duong 2,246 17,969.28 
6 Ha Tinh 46 10,564.40 
7 Hai Phong 369 7,247.77 
8 Thanh Hoa 44 7,150.24 
9 Phu Yen 57 6,531.20 
10 Hai Duong 272 5,379.47 
11 Quang Nam 79 4,984.23 
12 Quang Ninh 98 4,200.34 
13 Bac Ninh 294 4,158.23 
14 Quang Ngai 23 3,911.57 
15 Da Nang 239 3,683.96 
16 Long An 464 3,520.31 
17 Kien Giang 35 3,059.44 
18 Oil and gas 49 2,753.69 
19 Vinh Phuc 148 2,466.93 
20 Hung Yen 240 2,119.41 
21 Thua Thien Hue 67 1,948.30 
22 Bac Giang 101 1,668.84 
23 Tay Ninh 200 1,627.48 
24 Nghe An 33 1,546.35 
25 Binh Thuan 99 1,439.46 
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APPENDIX G: (CONTINUED) 
 
 
26 Tien Giang 51 1,072.71 
27 Khanh Hoa 89 1,033.33 
28 Ninh Binh 29 956.20 
29 Lao Cai 32 837.84 
30 Can Tho 59 801.09 
31 Ca Mau 7 780.60 
32 Ninh Thuan 29 775.64 
33 Binh Phuoc 102 759.32 
34 Binh Dinh 53 714.87 
35 Hau Giang 12 680.27 
36 Ha Nam 55 508.47 
37 Lam Dong 112 487.54 
38 Phu Tho 79 454.90 
39 Hoa Binh 30 397.16 
40 Ben Tre 32 261.49 
41 Nam Dinh 41 260.07 
42 Thai Binh 32 251.26 
43 Lang Son 30 192.50 
44 Thai Nguyen 32 148.41 
45 Dac Lac 5 146.37 
46 Tra Vinh 31 130.26 
47 An Giang 18 122.19 
48 Tuyen Quang 9 120.60 
49 Son La 10 116.38 
50 Vinh Long 23 113.47 
51 Yen Bai 19 99.98 
52 Bac Lieu 17 89.18 
53 Gia Lai          12 85.65 
54 Kon Tum          2 71.95 
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APPENDIX G: (CONTINUED) 
 
55 Quang Tri 16 67.69 
56 Dong Thap 16 46.83 
57 Quang Binh 5 34.78 
58 Cao Bang 14 34.63 
59 Soc Trang 10 30.04 
60 Dac Nong 6 19.66 
61 Bac Can 7 17.91 
62 Ha Giang 8 13.31 
63 Lai Chau 4 4.00 
  Total 14,522 210,521.65 
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APPENDIX H: TABLE 25: STATISTIC SUMMARY OF FDI PER CAPITA AND 
SOME EXPLANATORY VARIABLES20 
 
 
Variables Obs Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDIpercapita 378 1,711.38 3,705.95 0.19 31,171.73 
PCI 378 57.13 6.55 36.40 77.20 
FDIpercapita_1 378 1,512.99 3,460.28 0.20 31,171.73 
Bed 378 2.55 0.67 1.35 4.56 
Doctor 378 0.57 0.17 0.25 1.57 
TotalDoctor 378 2.35 0.73 1.07 5.60 
TotalStudent21 378 149.64 66.43 5.86 263.47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 All variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
 
21 The average number of patient beds per 1,000 people, the number of doctors per 1,000 people, and 
number of total doctors, physician, nurses and midwives measure the availability of medical and treatment 
conditions. The total number of students including primary, secondary and high school students may be a 
good proxy for a potentially good quality labor source of the FDI firm. One may expect that foreign 
investors prefer investing in the locations with more availability of potential labor source and advanced 
medical treatment. However, some investors may take the reverse direction with a hope to earn higher 
returns. 
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APPENDIX I: TABLE 26: REGRESSION OF FDI PER CAPITA  
ON SOME VARIABLES22 
 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
FDIpercapita_1 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.496*** 
 [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Bed -462.39 -491.38  -305.97 
 [0.113] [0.089]  [0.356] 
Budget 0.01 0.01  0.01 
 [0.732] [0.727]  [0.702] 
Doctor -4.77 -112.38   
 [0.996] [0.893]   
TotalStudent 4.40*** 4.37*** 3.69*** 4.65*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0] 
PCI -13.08  -18.44  
 [0.465]  [0.287]  
TotalDoctor    -320.34 
    [0.284] 
Constant 2,182.88** 1,577.82** 1,455.57 1,743.75** 
 [0.044] [0.024] [0.137] [0.01] 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 
N 378 378 378 378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 All variables are defined in the Appendix A. Numbers in parentheses represent the p-values for a t-test 
that the average t-statistic is zero. The fixed effect models are used as the Hausman test results reject the 
Null. The superscripts, ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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APPENDIX J: THE MAP OF VIETNAM 
 
 
 
 
